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I. INTRODUCTION
In early December, it was announced that United States (U.S.)
companies SolarWind and FireEye were the victims of a widespread
* The author is a Judge Advocate in the United States Navy. The views expressed in
this writing are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the Department
of the Navy or the United States Government. The author would like to thank
Breawna Power Eaton, for reading numerous drafts, providing excellent feedback,
and always being his best editor—both professionally and personally. The author
would also like to thank the Editorial Staff at the American University International
Law Review for vastly improving this writing, and importantly the faculty of The
Fletcher School, particularly, Professors Tom Dannenbaum and Michael Glennon.
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and pervasive cyber-attack that possibly affected tens of thousands of
government computers. “[T]he magnitude of this ongoing attack is
hard to overstate.”1 While the attack remains under investigation at the
time of this writing, “[e]vidence in the SolarWinds attack points to the
Russian intelligence agency known as the S.V.R., whose tradecraft is
among the most advanced in the world.”2 What will happen next, with
regard to both how the U.S. will respond and what they can and will
do to prevent future attacks, remains uncertain.
A major reason for this uncertainty is that the entire spectrum of
cyber warfare challenges the paradigm of how “war” has been
traditionally defined. The right to self-defense is present in almost all
legal systems, both between persons and between states. Between
nations, the debate over what level of force justifies a lawful use of
force in response, purportedly laid out in the United Nations Charter,
began even before the Charter was signed. Defining force in the cyber
domain poses new challenges, yet this unique, quickly evolving facet
of warfare has simply been pasted on top of the older, unresolved
debate.
It would be overly ambitious to attempt to resolve fundamental,
long-debated disagreements about how to read the language of Arts.
2(4) and 51. However, the analysis applied by the majority view –
looking at the “scale and effect” of cyber operations, as in Tallinn
Manual 2.0 – is unrealistic, unworkable, and undesirable. The
challenge of defining force in the cyber domain remains; however,
descriptively, predictively, and proscriptively, states are justified in
responding to any force with counterforce in self-defense,
proportionality acts as the throttle to self-defense, rather than the
unreasonably high standard of “scale and effect.”
The ability to reach out, with a few keystrokes or a couple lines of
code, through the interconnected world of cyberspace and create
militarily advantageous effects 10,000 miles away has changed
warfare as previously conceived, perhaps more than any other
1. Thomas P. Bossert, Opinion, I Was the Homeland Security Adviser to Trump.
We’re
Being
Hacked,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/opinion/fireeye-solarwinds-russiahack.html.
2. Id.
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advancement in any other domain of war. Cyber weapons are
weapons, and whatever law applies to conventional weapons equally
applies to cyber weapons.3 Long before cyber operations were even
science fiction, there was much debate over what constituted a use of
force that would justify force in response. In many ways, the debate
over what constitutes cyber-attacks has been pasted on top of that older
debate, but the unique form of harm that cyber-attacks cause adds
novel questions to these older debates. Lacking a physical instrument,
yet possessing the potential to cause greater harm, cyber-attacks seem
simultaneously less and more “forceful.” How one views that
dichotomy, coupled with how they generally view the Charter
regarding conventional force, has led to varying answers to the salient
question: what is the threshold of cyber force required to justify the
use of counterforce in self-defense?
When something breaks on the receiving end of a cyber-attack—
when people die, when fires erupt, when opened dams destroy
villages—few seem to disagree4 the act would be a “use of force,”
likely rising to the level of an “armed attack” that would justify lawful
force in “self-dense” in response, regardless how one regards the text
of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.5 The far more
complicated question is: what happens when nothing “physical”
breaks? When only data is destroyed, when government email stops
working, when banking systems fail, when stock markets crash, but
no one is injured, no property is destroyed?
A cyber-attack is not “a monolithic technique . . . there are many
methods by which computer networks have been, or could be,
attacked.”6 Each attack must be analyzed individually. However, the
most widely accepted view, as advanced in the Tallinn Manual 2.0,
3. See Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. SERIES U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLL. 73, 76 (2002) (noting that using a weapon to target a computer raises
the same questions under international law as would the targeting of any other piece
of equipment).
4. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS 341 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2nd ed. 2017) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
5. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 4, 51.
6. Silver, supra note 3, at 76 (proceeding to discuss various means of cyberattacks).
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looks to the “scale and effects”7 test adopted from the International
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) judgment in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua 8 This classic analysis is
reasonable at first glance, if one accepts a textual reading of the UN
Charter, even with limited modification based on subsequent state
practice and judicial decisions, as did the authors of the Manual (the
self-proclaimed International Group of Experts (IGEs)).9 Others have
argued that state practice has irretrievably broken the language of the
Charter, asserting that even engaging in a discussion over how to
interpret the terms “armed attack” in differentiation of “use of force”
is meaningless—states will do what states do.10
Various framings and weights given to the varying sources of
authority of how to interpret the language of the Charter, subsequent
state practice, and judicial decisions place the starting point of this
analysis in vastly different locations. Sean Murphy offers “Four
Schools of Thought” on how to interpret the UN Charter on the
question of preemptive self-defense.11 His Schools on that question
are: “‘The Strict-Constructionist School,’ ‘The Imminent Threat
School,’ ‘The Qualitative Threat,’ and ‘The ‘Charter-Is-Dead’
School.’”12
7. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 330–31 (referring to “scale and
effects” as “a shorthand term that captures the quantitative and qualitative factors to
be analyzed in determining whether a cyber operation amounts to the use of force”).
8. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
9. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, What’s Law Got to Do with It?, 26 WILSON
Q. 70, 75 (2002) (arguing that states act alone when acting multilaterally is not in
their best interest); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing
Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L. L. 809, 809 (1970)
(acknowledging that historically, states have sometimes “succumbed to the
temptation to settle a score, to end a dispute or to pursue their national interest
through the use of force”). But see W. Michael Reisman, Thomas Franck and the
Use of Force, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 403, 406 (2010) (highlighting the
United Nations’ major contribution of prohibiting war as individual state policy,
instead replacing it with a collective security system).
11. See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 699, 706 (2005) (acknowledging that the ‘Schools’ rest upon broad
conceptions of international law and that international lawyers within a specific
school may differ in certain respects).
12. Id. at 706–19.
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Murphy was analyzing a different question, but his schools offer
four general views on the status of the language of the Charter. 13
Adapting the labelling of his four Schools to reflect the current
question – how to define the threshold of a use of force justifying selfdefense – I offer: The ‘Charter-Is-Dead’ School, The Scale and Effects
School, The Forceful Countermeasures School, and The No Gap
School. How one approaches the language in Articles 2(4) and 51,
generally, and the weight given to sources of interpretation, likely lead
to how one views the more specific and novel questions of force
regarding cyber operations.14
Briefly, the Charter-Is-Dead School is clearly the outlier, which
would hold, as the name implies, that the language of the Charter is
dead, and states are lawfully free to use force at any time.15 However,
the Scale and Effects School, when applied to conventional and cyber
warfare, is most problematic in both its logic and widespread
acceptance.16 The problems begin with the theory’s establishment of
an unreasonably high threshold for the “most grave”17 uses of force
required to constitute an “armed attack” that would justify “selfdefense,” and these problems become all the more obvious in the cyber
domain.18 The Forceful Countermeasures School creates a messy,
complicated explanation that does provide more realistic remedies for
victims of force, but finds very little support in the text or claimed
practice.19 A focus on cyber operations demonstrates that The No Gap
School provides the best predictive (what states will do), descriptive
(what the law is), and prescriptive (what the law should be) analysis.20
Ultimately, much consensus building still must be done. In 2002,
13. See id.
14. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force:
Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 426–40 (2011)
(exploring the various interpretations of Articles 2(4) and 51).
15. Infra Part IX; see also Murphy, supra note 11, at 717–18 (introducing the
Charter-Is-Dead School).
16. Infra Part IX; see also Murphy, supra note 11, at 706–11 (what Murphy
referred to as the ‘Strict-Constructionist’ School).
17. Murphy, supra note 11, at 709–10; see also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191
(June 27).
18. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
19. Infra Part IX.
20. Infra Part IX.
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Daniel Silver believed, “[i]t is too early for any legal authority to
emerge on the status of [cyber-attacks] under Article 2(4).”21 Almost
two decades have passed, and the Scale and Effects School and Tallinn
Manual claims to be that legal authority.22 State practice, however,
proves that consensus false, nor is “scale and effect” prescriptively
what the law should be.23

II. WHY THIS QUESTION IS IMPORTANT.
To begin with the obvious, the internet powers our modern lives.
The “digital economy” alone consists of 6.9% of total U.S. GDP, and
“Information Technology” makes up 19.9% of the value of Standard
and Poor’s 500 (S&P).24 But it is hard to imagine the scale of potential
damage to other sectors that a large-scale cyber-attack could cause,
such as the Financial Sector, adding 20.7% to GDP, or just
“Financials” (13.7%) and “Communication Services” (9.9%) of the
S&P.25 Literally trillions of dollars, the proverbial wealth of nations.
Consider this: Cash only makes up 33% of current payments in the
U.S.26 While higher in some countries (78.8% in Europe), cash remains
the dominant method of payment across the world; however, there is
a general trend of moving away from cash transactions.27 The ability
21. Silver, supra note 3, at 75.
22. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
of Cyber Operations: What It Is and Isn’t, JUST SEC. (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37559/tallinn-manual-2-0-international-law-cyberoperations/ (introducing the Tallinn Manual).
23. Infra Part IX.
24. Digital Economy Accounted for 6.9 Percent of GDP in 2017, NAT’L
TELECOMMS.
&
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
5,
2019),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2019/digital-economy-accounted-69-percent-gdp2017 [hereinafter Digital Economy]; Tim Lemke, What is the Weighting of the S&P
500?, BALANCE, (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-sectorweighting-of-the-s-and-p-500-4579847.
25. See Digital Economy, supra note 24; Lemke, supra note 24.
26. RAYNIL KUMAR ET AL., FED. RSRV. SYS., 2018 FINDINGS FROM THE DIARY
OF
CONSUMER
PAYMENT
CHOICE
3,
10
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.frbsf.org/cash/files/federal-reserve-cpo-2018-diary-of-consumerpayment-choice-110118.pdf.
27. See
G4S,
WORLD
CASH
REPORT
2018
25
(2018),
https://www.g4scashreport.com/ (assessing the position of cash for transactional
purposes); CAPGEMINI, WORLD PAYMENTS REPORT 2019 32–35 (2019),
https://www.capgemini.com/es-es/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2019/09/World-
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to stop or even somewhat slow non-cash transactions would cripple
economic systems, and thereby debilitate the national structure of
government.28
The 2007 “botnet” attack against Estonia, demonstrated the power
of cyber operations: “This was not the first botnet strike ever, nor was
it the largest. But never before had an entire country been targeted on
almost every digital front all at once.”29 For weeks, “cash machines
and online banking services were sporadically out of action;
government employees were unable to communicate with each other
on email; and newspapers and broadcasters suddenly found they
couldn’t deliver the news,” effectively crippling Estonia.30 The attacks
were popularly attributed to Russia, over a dispute concentering the
removal of a Soviet era World War II memorial.31 However, the use of
“zombies” – “computers from around the world that had been hijacked
previously by hackers” – as well as specialized “hackers who could
infiltrate individual Web sites, delete legitimate content, and post their
own messages,” while routing through third counties such as Egypt,
Vietnam, and Peru, attempted to obfuscate the operation’s true
origins.32 Attribution of responsibility to any particular state of any
cyber operation will always be the fundamental challenging factual
and legal question.33 For the purpose of this writing, that fundamental
question will be put aside as a factual matter, and state direction with
requisite control to find state responsibility will be assumed.34 Attacks
Payments-Report-WPR-2019.pdf (detailing the growth of non-cash transactions).
28. See CAPGEMINI, supra note 27, at 32–35.
29. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,
WIRED (Aug. 21, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ (emphasizing
that this was the first time ever that a botnet threatened an entire nation’s national
security).
30. Damien McGuinness, How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2007), https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415.
31. See Davis, supra note 29.
32. Id. (concerning the challenges of cyber attribution); see also Yoram Dinstein,
Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. SERIES U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLL. 99, 107 (2002) (“The trouble, however, is that frequently the server
which is seemingly the source of the [cyber-attack] has only been manipulated by
the true assailants”).
33. See Silver, supra note 3, at 78 (noting that the issue of attributability “is
exacerbated by the amorphous structure of the Internet”).
34. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 115, 121 (June 27) (“effective control”);

704

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:4

like Estonia’s debilitating disruption will not be an enigma, neither
will they simply become more prevalent: they are the future of
warfare.35

III.

STARTING WITH THE TEXT

At first glance, the drafters of the UN Charter laid out a rather
straightforward approach to the use of force in Article 2(4): “[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state. . . .”36 The text leaves open two possible exceptions to this
general prohibition, and both have elicited substantial debate over
interpretation.37
First, the Security Council itself may authorize the use of force by
finding, in accordance with Article 39, “the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”38 Then, in Article 41, “[t]he
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. . . .”39
Then, in Article 42, “[s]hould the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security.”40
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case. No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“overall control”). Discussing issues of what
would constitute responsibility are, again, beyond the scope of this writing; for the
purpose of this writing state responsibility, at whatever the requisite level is
assumed.
35. See Davis, supra note 29 (comparing the advent of information warfare with
the advent of nuclear technology).
36. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
37. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41–42. There is a possibility that consent of the
state affected. For this writing and analysis, the assumption is that the effects of a
cyber operation are non-consensual.
38. U.N. Charter art. 39 (emphasis added).
39. U.N. Charter art. 41.
40. U.N. Charter art. 42. The drafters envisioned a (never materialized) standing
force, comprised of forces contributed by member states, to be employed by the
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The debate over Security Council sanctioned uses of force surround
when (if ever) the Security Council can, in what Article 2(7) proports
to prohibit, “intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.”41 Also, how to interpret the terms
“threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” in light
of the term “international peace” in the last phrase.42 Does the term
“international” modify the entire article, effectively limiting the
Security Council’s scope, together with Article 2(7), to only matters
of cross-border violence, or is a threat to peace (international or
otherwise) whatever the Security Council says it is?
The International Court of Justice potentially has the power to
clarify the scope of the Security Council’s discretion, as “[t]he Court
has not hesitated to tell other organs of the United Nations that they
may not exceed their assigned powers.”43 The court having “never
[ . . . ] declared any act of the Security Council invalid as beyond the
scope of its authority,” “sees thus far to have left open the
question. . . .”44 Professor Glennon’s textual conclusion is that Articles
39 and 2(7) read together limit Security Council action to “at least a
threat of action by a state that is (a) violent and (b) has cross-border
effects.”45 The Security Council has generally followed this
restriction, but beginning in 1966 with Rhodesia, “cracks began to
appear in the old anti-interventionalist regime.”46 Especially between
the five Permanent Members, politics, not the text, is clearly the best
predictor of when the Security Council will and will not take action,
particularly when dealing with what could be viewed as “within the
domestic jurisdiction”47 of a state.48 This debate need not be resolved
Security Council in Art. 43.
41. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
42. U.N. Charter art. 39.
43. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 103 (2001) [hereinafter INTERVENTIONISM AFTER
KOSOVO].
44. Id.
45. Id. at 108.
46. Id. at 113.
47. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
48. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty
Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 506 (1995) (exploring the Security Council’s changes
throughout its first fifty years of existence).
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for the purposes of this writing, since I will only be considering cyber
operations that are cross-border, state-on-state actions, the dominant,
yet still “unworkable”49 system, wherein the Security Council has
chosen to intervene, though they might be considered internal affairs.
The second exception for the lawful use of force, and the subject of
this writing, Article 51, permits states to use force “until” (perhaps,
before) the Security Council acts in “individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”50
Far more debate has ensued over Article 51. The question of
preemptive self-defense is perhaps the dominant issue, addressed by
Murphy’s original four Schools, because the Security Council rarely
acts and states usually claim to be using force in self-defense when
they do.51 Adherents of the four schools, along different lines, diverge
over the threshold, interpretive question about the weight to give text,
legal opinions, and state practice.52 The three main questions of law on
which the schools differ are as follows: 1) is there a difference between
the terms “use of force” and “armed attack?” 2) if so, what is the
practical “gap” between the two? and 3) again, if there is a difference,
what action is authorized within that gap? No school asserts that cyber
violence cannot be force, but it is necessary to answer these questions
regarding conventional force, in order to project how each School
views the questions in the cyber domain.

IV.

CHARTER-IS-DEAD SCHOOL

The group most likely to find the forgoing discussion meaningless
and overly tedious would be the Charter-Is-Dead School, which holds
that “the prohibition against the use of force in relations between states
has been eroded beyond recognition.”53 The Charter-Is-Dead School
49. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the
Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 136 (1987) (“internationally
authorized military coercion has proven unworkable”).
50. U.N. Charter art. 51.
51. Murphy, supra note 11, at 699 (analyzing the doctrine of preemptive selfdefense).
52. See id.
53. Franck, supra note 10, at 835. But see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4,
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would argue that whatever the original meaning and intent of the
drafters on the interplay between Articles 2(4) and 51, subsequent state
practice has eviscerated any remaining meaning.54 “The practice of
these states has so severely shattered the mutual confidence which
would have been the sine qua non of an operative rule of law
embodying the precepts of Article 2(4) that . . . only the words
remain.”55 Prof. Glennon writes, “the Charter provisions governing the
use of force are simply no longer regarded as binding international
law.”56
Various scholars, sampling from various time periods, record the
sheer quantity of post Charter armed conflict:57 “Between 1945 and
1980, there were over 100 wars;”58 “some 90 armed conflicts between
1989 and 1993;”59 “in February 1998 . . . 30 ‘major ongoing wars;’”60
and, as of 2018, “at least 69 armed conflicts occurred on the territory
of 30 states.”61 Glennon continues, “not all war necessarily involves a
use of force in violation of Article 2(4) . . . [but, t]ruly international
conflict[s], however, would necessarily entail an unlawful use of force
insomuch as not every participant can avail itself of the self-defense
exception.”62 States as lawmakers in the international positivist system
are “bound only by rules to which they consent. A treaty can lose its
binding effect if a sufficient number of parties engage in conduct that

at 330 (discussing “scale and effects” as a measure of determining whether a
particular action constitutes an armed attack).
54. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 717–19 (“the rules have fallen into
desuetude”).
55. Franck, supra note 10, at 809.
56. Michael J. Glennon, Opinion, How War Left Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov.
21, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/opinion/how-war-left-the-lawbehind.html [hereinafter How War Left Law Behind]; see also INTERVENTIONISM
AFTER KOSOVO, supra note 43, at 85–86.
57. Id. at 67–69.
58. Id. at 67.
59. Id. at 68 (citing Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, Conflict Resolution and
the End of the Cold War 1989-1993, 31 J. PEACE RES. 333 (1994)).
60. Id. at 69 (citing THE CARTER CENTER, CONFLICT RESOLUTION UPDATE:
UPDATE ON WORLD CONFLICTS (1998)).
61. ANNYSSA BELLAL, GENEVA ACAD., THE WAR REPORT: ARMED CONFLICTS
IN 2018 19 (Apr. 2019), http://www.rulac.org/news/the-war-report-armed-conflictsin-2018.
62. INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO, supra note 43, at 69.
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is at odds with the constraints of the treaty.”63 The irony is that
“[p]olicy makers are of course loath to admit th[is].”64
The Charter-Is-Dead School would not necessarily argue that states
resort to violence with the frequency of a Hamilton duel, but that
power, particularly the relative power of states, will be the governing
force on states, not the text of the Charter.65 For the Charter-Is-Dead
School, if state practice has eviscerated the law against the use of
force, then a differentiation between words like “use of force” versus
“armed attack,” versus “scale and effect,” and “most grave” versus a
“mere frontier incident” lacks any meaning.66 If there is no longer (or
never was) a prohibition on the use of force, it is unhelpful to analyze
when, if ever, to classify a cyber operation as such.67
The School would view cyber-attacks the same way Glennon
analyzed support for terrorism: “If there is no authoritative general
prohibition of the use of force, it makes no sense to consider the
breadth of a possible exception.”68 Looking at the 2007 cyber-attacks
in Estonia, the Charter-Is-Dead argument would follow that Estonia
did not respond to Russia’s attack, not because they viewed the
operation as not rising to the level of the scale and effect of an armed
attack, but because responding with force, cyber or physical, would
ignite a war Estonia would surely lose.69 Conversely, if the alleged
perpetrator and target were reversed, Russia would not restrain itself
simply because the attack did not cross the gravity threshold to allow
self-defense.70 Russia would likely respond with force, if it viewed
doing so to be in its best interest—the law be damned.71 The varying
63. How War Left Law Behind, supra note 56.
64. Id.
65. INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO, supra note 43, at 2–3 (arguing that no
rule has successfully obliged states to refrain from intervention).
66. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 191, 195 (June 27).
67. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 539, 541 (2002).
68. Id.
69. ALISON LAWLOR RUSSELL, CYBER BLOCKADES 69, 88 (2014) (noting that
Estonia ultimately classified the cyber-attacks as criminal activity).
70. Id. at 131.
71. Id. at 87.
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applications of the debated principle of desuetude differentiates
scholars based on the degree to which they view the rule against the
use of force in Article 2(4) has been changed by custom. 72 But all
adherents would assert that functionally, “[t]he United Nations
Charter today bears little more resemblance to the modern world than
does a Magellan map.”73
The Charter-is-Dead School appears to have significant expository
and predictive power.74 Looking back to why states did or did not use
force as well as looking forward and hypothesizing when states will
use force, power, and national interest seems far more salient than
law.75 “Critics may argue that states involved in conflict will always
put their vital interests first.”76 Finally, descriptively (as to what the
law is), no one believes that the UN Charter system is working well,
and the Charter-is-Dead School makes the most honest attempt to deal
with how to treat the widespread, Charter-violating, state practice of
use of force.77
While the Charter-is-Dead School seems to get closest to a unified
theory explaining state practice, it seems unhelpful to stop here and
declare there is no prohibition against the use of conventional or cyber
force.78 Certainly, though actions loudly speak otherwise, not all states
believe this position. In powerful states (U.S., Russia, China), future
personal criminal liability for international crimes is unlikely;79
72. See INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO, supra note 43, at 60–61 (“The
concept of desuetude describes the process by which subsequent custom or practice
supplants a treaty norm . . . Hans Kelsen considered desuetude the ‘negative legal
effect of custom’ . . . if [a] written instrument derived force by virtue of public
acceptance, inconsistent custom must be given effect by the same practice. Still, the
concept of desuetude is controversial . . . [c]ustom inconsistent with a treaty
constitutes, at least initially, a violation of the treaty.”).
73. Franck, supra note 10, at 810.
74. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 108.
75. Hargrove, supra note 49, at 136–37.
76. Documents on the Laws of War 15 (Adam Robert & Richard Guelff eds.,
1982).
77. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 352.
78. See David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality
in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 235, 246 (2013).
79. David Davenport, Will the International Criminal Court Prosecute
Americans
Over
Afghanistan?,
FORBES
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2018/03/26/will-the-international-
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however, many partner nations of the U.S., (i.e. NATO nations) have
domestic law liability for international crimes.80 While the Charter-isDead may be right that power and national interest are the most
important factors in determining state action, they go too far in
claiming that law has zero impact on decision makers.81 Neither should
we want power to be the only thing that has the force of law, especially
since what humans might view as law is a complicated mix of what is
actually enforceable, what we believe to it be, as well as a small
sprinkling of what we might wish it to be. In powerful states, the effect
of legitimating the Charter’s force may be tertiary at best, but this will
vary country to country.82 Assuming, as the Charter-is-Dead School
does, that state practice has fully eroded the language of Articles 2(4)
and 51, it is still curious that states rarely admit to unsanctioned force,
yet use conventional legal arguments to explain their actions as lawful;
thus, even assuming its potential lowest ebb, law still has some bearing
on how states justify their actions.83

V. SCALE AND EFFECTS SCHOOL
The Tallinn Manual adopts the “scale and effects” test from the
Nicaragua judgment in what can only be described as the most classic
approach to interpreting the UN Charter, which is entirely appropriate
and predictable.84 After all, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is—”[t]he product
of a four-year follow-on project by a new group of 19 renowned
international law experts [self-styled as the International Group of
Experts, or the IGE] . . . the project benefited from the unofficial input
of many states and over 50 peer reviewers.”85 Albeit with some
criminal-court-prosecute-americans-over-afghanistan/#314f736010a5.
80. See generally Cleo Meinicke, Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes
–
Introduction,
PILPG
(March
7,
2019),
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org (exploring some of the
principles under which domestic laws may be used to prosecute international
crimes).
81. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 334.
82. See Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual
2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 586
(2018).
83. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 346.
84. See id. at 331, 334; see also Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 263.
85. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at intro.
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internal disagreement at where to draw the line, the thread tying the
Scale and Effect School together is a differentiation between what
adherents would describe as the lower level of violence term “use of
force” from Article 2(4) and higher level of violence Article 51 term
“armed attack” being, as the Court in Nicaragua describes, the “most
grave forms of the use of force.”86 While not ignoring state practice,
the Scale and Effects School’s analysis focuses more on the text and
judicial decisions.87
Michael N. Schmitt, the Director of the project, wrote, “[t]he IGE
worked assiduously to be objective”; further, “any claims that Tallinn
Manual 2.0 takes this or that position should be viewed with a degree
of skepticism”; however, “States should conclude that either asserting
the same position [as the Manual] is likely to be an easy sell, or
challenging it is going to be an uphill battle.”88
The Manual consists of two types of text. “Black letter rules” [text in bold]
required unanimity and are meant to reflect lex lata (the law as it exists),
not lex ferenda (what the law should be) . . . The heart of the Manual is
instead in its commentary. It is here that a rule, its terminology, and the
legal rationale for finding that it represents lex lata is set forth. Just as
important in the commentary is the discussion of the various opinions
among the IGE as to the application of the rule and its interpretation.
Although all members concurred in the text of a Rule, they sometimes
differed over its meaning in particular circumstances. 89

Understanding this approach, Rule 71 is most helpful in clarifying
the IGE’s position on how to define “armed attack”: “A State that is
the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack
may exercise its inherent right of self-defence. Whether a cyber
operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and
effects.”90 Contained within this rule, the IGE comes to a number of
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 191, 195 (June 27); Dinstein, supra note 32, at
100; Dapo Akande & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The International Court of Justice
and the Concept of Aggression, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY
214, 217 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds., 2016).
87. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 341.
88. Schmitt, supra note 22.
89. Id.
90. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 339. Bold in original. See supra, note
68. Bold rules from the Manual indicate “‘black letter rules’ [that] required
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important conclusions for the Scale and Effects School. First, an
effects-based rather than means-based test to define armed attack: “the
critical factor [is] the effects of a cyber operation, as distinct from the
means used to achieve the effects.”91 Second, concurring in the
differentiation of the terms ‘armed attack’ and ‘use of force,’ “an
‘armed attack’ is not to be equated with the term ‘use of force’ . . . [a]n
armed attack presupposes at least a use of force in the sense of Article
2(4).92 However, as noted by the [ICJ], not every use of force rises to
the level of an armed attack.”93 Third, the adoption of the “‘scale and
effects’ [threshold test for armed attacks] drawn from the Nicaragua
judgment.”94
By accepting the “scale and effects” test, the IGE is explicitly not
adopting a physical damage requirement for an incident to be an armed
attack.95 However, it is clear that some of the IGE would go this far,
as “[s]ome of the experts took the position that harm to persons or
physical damage to property is a condition precedent to the
characterization of an incident as an armed attack.”96 Even without
adopting a physical damage requirement, the Manual states, “the law
is unclear as to the precise point at which the effects of a cyber
operation qualify as an armed attack.”97
Whether my disagreement is with the Manual or perhaps simply
some of the IGE, there are three incidents or hypotheticals where the
IGE struggled to definitively see an action as an armed attack which
should be viewed as such. First, in “the 2010 Stuxnet operation[,] in
light of the damage the operation caused to Iranian centrifuges, some
members of the [IGE] were of the view that it reached the armed attack

unanimity.” Commentaries are not in bold. Hereafter, the same bold/not bold
distinction will be maintained for quotations from the Tallinn Manual.
91. Id. at 340; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 90–91 (1996); Hargrove, supra note 49, at
138.
92. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 341.
93. Id.; Dinstein, supra note 32, at 100; Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note
86, at 219.
94. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 341.
95. Id. at 342.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 341
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threshold . . . [o]ther Experts took the contrary view.”98 Second, for “a
cyber incident directed against a major international stock exchange
that causes the market to crash,” “some Experts were unprepared to
label it as an armed attack because they were not satisfied that mere
financial loss constitutes damage” sufficient for an armed attack. 99
Finally, while separately discussing the lack of application of the law
of armed conflict (LOAC) to the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia,
the IGE concurred, apparently without objection, that “the situation
did not rise to the level of an armed conflict.”100 Contrary to these
views, all three scenarios, even under the internal logic of “scale and
effects” test, should be considered armed attacks.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands has adopted a similar approach.101
A July 5, 2019, letter from the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands to their Parliament laid out the Netherlands’ legal position
on cyber operations: “[T]o determine whether an operation constitutes
an armed attack, the scale and effects of the operation must be
considered.”102 Further, “[a]n armed attack is not the same as the use
of force within the meaning of article 2(4) of the UN Charter.”103 The
Government of the Netherlands, while not seeing physical damage as
required, seems to at least keep the threshold for armed attacks to
“very serious non-material consequences”104:
A cyber-attack that has comparable consequences to an armed attack
(fatalities, damage and destruction) can justify a response with cyber
weapons or conventional weapons . . . There is therefore no reason not to
qualify a cyberattack against a computer or information system as an armed
attack if the consequences are comparable to those of an attack with
conventional or non-conventional weapons. At present there is no
98. Id. at 342.
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id. at 376.
101. See, e.g., Letter from the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to
the Parliament, 1, 4 (July 5, 2019) (available online) (English translation)
https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/parliamentarydocuments/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-incyberspace/International+Law+in+the+Cyberdomain+-+Netherlands.pdf
[Hereinafter Netherlands Letter] (discussing the Netherlands’ obligations under
international law regarding cyberspace).
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 9.
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international consensus on qualifying a cyberattack as an armed attack if it
does not cause fatalities, physical damage or destruction yet nevertheless
has very serious non-material consequences.105

While not wholly ruling out the possibility of a cyber operation that
lacked physical effects being an armed attack, by specifically citing
“fatalities, damage and destruction,” the government of the
Netherlands seemed more reticent than the IGE.106 While the
Netherlands’ letter does not analyze specific hypotheticals, the
government’s position appears to be falling on the more restrictive end
of the spectrum of the IGE, perhaps still reading a cyber-attack caused
stock market crash as “very serious non-material consequences.”107 In
the Netherlands’ analysis defining of “use of force,” the farthest the
government would go is, “at this time it cannot be ruled out that a
cyber operation with very serious financial or economic impact may
qualify as a use of force.”108 If the Netherlands is hesitant to
conclusively define “very serious financial or economic impact” as
even a use of force, it seems unlikely the government would define it
as an armed attack, despite later holding out the possibility.109
This notion, that even within the scale and effects test a cyber
operation must have some physical effects, has some important
adherents in a 2012 article co-written by Michael Schmitt and others:
“[a]lthough there is no bright-line scale-and-effects test to distinguish
grave from nongrave consequences, legal experts generally agree that
to qualify as an armed attack, a cyber-attack must result in death or a
significant degree of injury to persons or physical damage to
property.”110
The debate within the Scale and Effect School is not simply a
division between a physical effect or not, as evidenced by the IGE’s
lack of consensus over how to define the Stuxnet operation, which
obviously did have physical effects.111 Even when physical effects are
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. William H. Boothby et al., When is a Cyberattack a Use of Force or an
Armed Attack?, 45 COMPUT. SOC’Y 82, 83 (2012).
111. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 342. See generally Kim Zetter, An
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present, some would still find them below the level of an armed attack,
in what the Court in Nicaragua regretfully labels “mere frontier
incidents.”112 Those adopting the Court’s frontier incidents logic could
divide over scale regardless of the presence of physical effects—
perhaps viewing Stuxnet as not an armed attack, despite physical
damage, and a total stock market crash as an armed attack, in spite of
no physical damage.113
There is somewhat of an artificial yet important barrier between the
Scale and Effects and the Forceful Countermeasure Schools, which is
the lawfulness of forceful countermeasures in the space between a use
of force and an armed attack.114 “A contentious issue with respect to
the limitations on countermeasures is whether they may consist of
actions that amount to a use of force.”115 This distinction is somewhat
artificial, because
all the members of the [IGE] agreed that countermeasures may not rise to
the level of an armed attack . . . they were divided over whether cyber
countermeasures crossing the use of force threshold but not reaching that
of an armed attack, are lawful . . . the majority of the [IGE], the obligation
to refrain from the use of force is a key limitation on an injured State when
conducting countermeasures.116

Despite the debate within the IGE, I will attribute the majority
opinion of the IGE to the Scale and Effect School and the minority
opinion to the later discussed Forceful Countermeasures School. This
distinction is important because the remedies open to a victim state
under each school would be vastly different.

VI.

PROBLEMS WITH SCALE AND EFFECTS

Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3,
2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ (noting
that Stuxnet “escaped the digital realm to wreak physical destruction on equipment
the computers controlled”).
112. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
113. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 342 (specifying that all Experts found
Stuxnet to be a use of force, while some also considered it to be an armed attack).
114. See Efrony & Shany, supra note 82, at 591.
115. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 125.
116. Id.
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SCHOOL
The Scale and Effects School, as advanced in the Tallinn Manual,
explicitly described by Michael Schmitt, is only attempting to be
descriptive, not prescriptive.117 The Scale and Effects School makes a
concerted effort to read the Charter honestly, informed by relevant
opinions of the ICJ.118 But by leaving a gap between Articles 2(4) and
51, and a wide gap at that, the Scale and Effects School leaves only
three unworkable outcomes: 1) a system where a state that is a victim
of a cyber-attack not rising to an armed attack can do little more than
complain to the Security Council, 2) the likely unsuccessful, use of
countermeasures short of force, or 3) the unlawful use of
counterforce.119 None produce a satisfying or realistic result. Divining
the future is always challenging, but this author views setting such a
high bar for a forceful response as more likely to encourage violence,
than discourage it.120
A functionalist look at the Charter exposes the illogical conclusion
of the supposed objective, the senseless, strict textualism of the Scale
and Effects School.121 That supposed textualist reading cannot be
correct because of the size of this unrealistic gap, particularly in our
three scenarios, is akin to 1) Stuxnet, 2) a stock-market crash, and 3)
the 2007 Estonia attacks. The Scale and Effects School fails
predictively, descriptively, and prescriptively. Predictively, states will
not adhere to the overly rigid standard form of scale and effects—
making most states lawbreakers.122 Descriptively, the Nicaragua
117. See Silver, supra note 3, at 80.
118. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 340.
119. Under the Scale and Effects School, states could also use non-forceful
countermeasures, as well as attempts to mobilize international political support, or
international condemnation for the aggressor state. Interestingly, this would likely
resemble the actions a weaker state would employ against more powerful states,
even if the actions were viewed as an armed attack, regardless of how the law is
viewed. Estonia’s response in 2007 may be an example. See id. at 333, 337.
120. See Efrony & Shany, supra note 82, at 590 (discussing the counterintuitive
outcome of a narrow definition of “use of force”).
121. Cf. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 341 (noting that “the parameters of
the scale and effects criteria remain unsettled beyond the indication that they need
to be grave”).
122. See Franck, supra note 10, at 837 (predicting that the rules “will bend and
break” so long as nations have interests that run counter to stated international legal
norms).
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decision is inherently flawed, particularly when applied to cyber
operations.123 Moreover, despite a claimed effects-based analysis,
there is a means-based bias baked into the Scale and Effects School—
bombs are inherently more likely to break things than code. Even
accepting the test as enumerated, the Tallinn Manual’s analysis is
flawed.124 Stronger answers can be found by comparing cyber-attacks
to conventional means that would have similar effects: a) Is a denial
of service more like frequency jamming or destroying communication
lines? b) Is an attack that closes a state off from commerce more like
economic sanctions or a blockade? c) Is invasive malware more like
espionage or sabotage? Finally, prescriptively, even if you retain some
of the separation between armed attack and other lower uses of force,
as the language of the Charter might support, the principle of
proportionality is a better, more workable guide than the logic of
Nicaragua.125

A. PREDICTIVE PROBLEMS.
Why is predictability important? It is highly likely that many legal
thinkers (particularly of international law) would find it far simpler to
look into the past, at treaties, practice (customary law), and legal
decisions and discern what the law is, but this leaves out critically
forward-looking analysis. Past state practice obviously has a primary
role in the making of law, but what is the purpose of a description of
law that will be certainly ignored? This begs a philosophical question:
Can a rule that no one believes will be followed truly be law? “It is not
enough that the [the primary rules] be internally coherent: they must
be intrinsically compelling.”126 This a key failure of the Scale and
Effect School, particularly as applied to cyber operations.
Thankfully, a wide scale, long-term nation-crippling cyber-attack
has not occurred,127 but suppose a large scale and persistent cyberattack upon the stock exchange or financial institutions of a country
does happen, causing widespread and ongoing financial collapse –
123. Silver, supra note 3, at 81.
124. See Peter Z. Stockburger, Known Unknowns: State Cyber Operations, Cyber
Warfare, and the Jus Ad Bellum, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 546, 579–80 (2016).
125. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 352.
126. Hargrove, supra note 49, at 137.
127. Silver, supra note 3, at 78.
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stock values crater, all investment effectively stops, electronic means
of payment cease functioning, workers cannot be paid, citizens are
unable to access funds in bank accounts – but no physical damage
occurs, and the attack is clearly and unambiguously attributable to
another state.128 No one would realistically argue that a victim state
would not stop the attack if they had the means, either kinetic or
cyber.129 While, again, some of the Scale and Effects School would see
such a nation-crippling act as rising to an armed attack, clearly some
of the IGE wouldn’t go this far.130 Assuming all would agree that any
state would respond in claimed “self-defense” when vitally threatened
with force, what would be the purpose of a law that would a) come to
such an illogical conclusion and b) be so likely disregarded? Few
states would admit to law-breaking; rather, their justification would
simply be that the attack rose to the level of an armed attack, justifying
self-defense. Such a rule, that will predictively be disregarded, while
given lip-service, is just as unhelpful.131
More likely than the hypothetical large-scale attack would be socalled “pin-prick” attacks, a series of smaller, far less damaging but
repeated attacks, again without physical damage.132 The Tallinn
Manual struggles on how to view these attacks, asking should they be
viewed collectively or individually?133 But the problem remains the
same, “a paper rule”134 that will be disregarded cannot be the rule:
128. Id. at 73, 77–78. Realistically, attribution will always be the most difficult
matter, both factually and in terms of state responsibility. These issues, although
highly interesting, are beyond the scope of this writing.
129. Schmitt, supra note 22 (noting that the rules coming out of the Tallinn
Manual capture the reasonable position nations can take).
130. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 343 (showing the differing
position of the Experts regarding labeling an attack an armed attack).
131. Silver, supra note 3, at 83 (“Such a position would either legalize under
Article 2(4) a broad range of hostile and destructive acts that fail to reach the armed
attack threshold or would provide an incentive to lower the Article 51 threshold old,
with a concurrent risk of expanding violence under the pretext of legitimate selfdefense.”).
132. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 107
(2000) (explaining use of the “pin-prick” theory by states justifying responses to
armed attacks).
133. See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342 (agreeing that a
determinative factor turns on if the attacks are linked and have the same origin).
134. Michael J. Glennon, Debate with Alain Pellet: Force and the Settlement of
Political Disputes, The Hague Academy of International Law 7 (Sept. 7, 2007),
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“paper rules may still in some circumstances generate
compliance―but not often enough to qualify as law, for the key
element of obligation is missing.”135
Admittedly, this is applying a forward-looking version of the
Charter-Is-Dead School’s view of past state practice, but the value is
the same. There must be some linkage between law and practice, past
or predictively future.136 If the scale and effects test is to survive, all
consideration of physical effects must be jettisoned; when speaking of
“gravity,”137 the entire “consequences,” as used in The Netherlands
letter, of a cyber operation must be considered.138 All states will not
use force in self-defense, but it is unlikely that law (under scale and
effects) is what will restrain them.139 As with the 2007 Estonia attacks,
political considerations and real-world power dynamics will be the
deciding factors.140 Because of the waffling found in the Tallinn
Manual and the Netherlands legal opinion, the Scale and Effects
School provides little predictive value.141 In fact, the predictive reality
is that, contrary to the rule, states will use self-defense when vital
interests are threatened and will justify their action as a response to an
armed attack despite (not because of) the scale and effects test.142

B. DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEMS.
My objections to the descriptive value of Scale and Effects School,
at its core, are twofold: 1) The scale and effects test as conceived by
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092212 (citing, Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910)).
135. Id. at 7.
136. See Silver, supra note 3, at 82 (discussing the applicability of past laws in
reference to newer technologies and challenges).
137. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 228 (June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.).
138. Netherlands Letter, supra note 101, at 4, 8.
139. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 331, 339 (explaining the factors
of the “scale and effects” test when determining whether a state should respond in
self-defense).
140. Accord McGuinness, supra note 30 (explaining the 2007 Estonian attack).
141. See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 330–31, 333–34
(noting the wide range of outcomes that can result from using the use of force
factors).
142. Id. at 339.
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the Court in Nicaragua should not be the test, and 2) even assuming
the logic of the Court is correct, as applied by the Tallinn Manual to
cyber operations, it fails to value cyber property correctly.
i. Problems with Scale and Effects, as conceived.
While the desire is not to conduct a full-fledged analysis of the
weaknesses of Nicaragua and its logic, continued into its progeny Oil
Platforms, it is necessary to stop and ponder this misstep of judgeship-”a misfortune of some magnitude” that was “deeply unwise” --and
why it should be disregarded whole cloth.143 First, obviously and
fundamentally, as with all ICJ opinions, its decisions have no
precedential value and are only binding on the parties concerned and
only for the current matter.144 From a starting point, the decision
should simply be viewed as a foul ball—an event that occurred, but
should have no bearing on the rest of the game.
The Nicaragua Court attempts to deal with the admitted language
difference between “use of force” from Article 2(4) and “armed
attack” from Article 51, but the case is a poor vehicle for that
distinction.145 The court in Nicaragua was jurisdictionally limited to
customary law claims because of U.S. reservations when assenting to
the Statute of the ICJ.146 While the court asserts, in concordance with
the U.S. position, that customary international law is congruent with
the Charter, but because the court is only able to pass judgment on
what customary law is, the court cannot answer, beyond dicta, what
that the law under the Charter actually is—further limiting whatever
precedential value one might give it.147 While state practice (coupled
with opino juris) can certainly modify treaty law, actual practice must

143. See Hargrove, supra note 49, at 140 (questioning the holding of Nicaragua
and its impact on international law).
144. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute] (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case.”).
145. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 33, 51, 56, 173, 190 (June 27).
146. Id. ¶ 182.
147. Id. ¶ 187; see also Hargrove, supra note 49, at 137 (“The Court put itself into
a position that required it to apply exclusively customary international law, largely
derivative from the United Nations Charter but nevertheless separate.”).
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be given a larger focus when determining customary law.148 Beyond
stating that the U.S. views the language of the Charter to be customary
law, the Court does not meaningfully engage in an effort to consider
state practice.149 Beyond whatever the Court and U.S. mean that the
language of the Charter is customary law, are not the particulars of
how the U.S. (and all other states) interpret (i.e. opinio juris) the
Charter, the real question that would need to be considered to find
customary law?
Here, the Court makes the assertion:
[I]f a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule,
but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is
in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm
rather than to weaken the rule. 150

While, certainly, a state claiming “the State’s conduct is in fact
justifiable”151 strengthens the argument that there is a rule, it does the
opposite of what the court claims: it strengthens the claim that the rule,
or at least the state’s interpretation of that rule, is what the state claims
it to be.152 If sufficient state practice and opinio juris exist for the new
or even original, correct interpretation, although potentially textually
inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the rule, then the rule is
what the prima facie “rule-breaker” says it is.153 One needs not go
wholly over to the Charter-is-Dead School to see the obvious problem
of the ubiquitous state practice of justifying “self-defense” in
situations the Nicaragua Court would label as “mere frontier
incident[s].”154
The reason the Court needed to distinguish “most grave forms of
the use of force” versus “other less grave forms”155 was to determine
whether the United States’ actions could have been justifiable as
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 184.
Id. ¶¶ 173–74.
Id. ¶ 186.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id. ¶ 186.
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collective self-defense.156 The court adds a requirement to collective
self-defense that the “state which is the victim of an armed attack
which must form and declare the view that it has been so attacked.”157
The court would clearly apply the same “scale and effects” threshold
test as the predicate for either individual or collective self-defense;158
however, it is also clear that the court took into consideration that
Costa Rica and Honduras never directly alleged to be the victim of an
armed attack,159 and El Salvador only claimed to be the victim of an
armed attack long after the alleged incidents occurred.160 The question
of self-perceived victimhood would not be helpful to individual selfdefense, as this entire discussion concerning what level of force
justifies self-defense would be moot if the targeted state (and one-inthe-same, responding state) did not even believe it was the victim of
an armed attack.161 Even if still using “scale and effects,” it is
interesting to consider if the court’s judgment would have viewed the
actions of Nicaragua as not rising to an armed attack, if one or all of
the three states concerned (Costa Rica, Honduras, or El Salvador)
would have immediately: 1) declared their perceived victimhood of an
armed attack and 2) responded with individual self-defense.162
Despite the court attempting to separate the analysis of defining an
armed attack (i.e., scale and effects)163 as distinct from attribution to a
state (i.e., effective control),164 it is clear the court bled the concepts
together:
Even assuming that the supply of arms to the opposition in El Salvador
could be treated as imputable to the Government of Nicaragua, to justify
invocation of the right of collective self-defence in customary international
law, it would have to be equated with an armed attack by Nicaragua on El
Salvador . . . Even at a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and again
assuming the participation of the Nicaraguan Government, that would not

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. ¶ 193.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id.
Id. ¶ 234.
Id. ¶ 233.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id. ¶¶ 233–34.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id. ¶ 116.
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constitute such armed attack.165

Further evidence that the Court conflates gravity with
responsibility, the United States’ “mere supply of funds to the contras
while undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of
Nicaragua, . . . does not in itself amount to a use of force.”166 The Court
conflates the supply of funds with the actus reus of a use of force,
which it certainly is not, with state responsibility, which it very well
could be. Judge Yusuf argued in 2012 that the Court was never even
defining “armed attack,”167 if true, then 1) Nicaragua should be
disregarded as to definition of “armed attack,” and 2) the Court’s
language seriously confused the issue.168
However, the Court is not alone in this blending. In UN General
Assembly Resolution 3314, the Assembly in their definition of
aggression included in Article 3, “The action of a State in allowing its
territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a
third State; and (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed above.”169
165. Id. ¶ 230.
166. Id. ¶ 228.
167. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Notion of ‘Armed Attack’ in the Nicaragua
Judgement and Its Influence on Subsequent Case Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 461,
461, 465 (2012) (“It is my view that the clearest understanding of the Court’s
definition of an ‘armed attack’ in Nicaragua is to be had by situating it in its context:
the Court was presented with a specific task, namely to adjudicate a dispute
concerning ‘armed bands’ acting under the auspices of another state, and to
determine the conditions necessary for a justifiable exercise of collective selfdefence. Thus, the issue presented was not to define an armed attack proper (i.e., at
the hands of regular armed forces of a state), or even an armed attack by unaffiliated
irregulars, but rather to characterize acts of force carried out by indirect means and
through irregular forces that may justify the exercise of collective self-defence.”);
see also Yusuf, supra, at 466 (“The Nicaragua definition of an ‘armed attack’ by
the Court could have been construed as applicable only to indirect uses of force and
to collective self-defence if the Court itself did not expand the scope of application
of the standard it formulated in Nicaragua in its subsequent judgment in Oil
Platforms.”).
168. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 116, 195, 228, 230.
169. G.A. Res. 3114 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶¶ (f)–(g) (Dec. 14, 1974); see also Akande
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The Court in the Oil Platforms case, following the example from
Nicaragua continued to mix the idea of responsibility with gravity
when it could not even definitively conclude that the mining of a naval
vessel would constitute an armed attack.170
The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single
military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the ‘inherent right of
self-defence’; but in view of all the circumstances, including the
inconclusiveness of the evidence of Iran’s responsibility for the mining of
the USS Samuel B Roberts, the Court is unable to hold that the attacks on
the Salman and Nasr platforms have been shown to have been justifiably
made in response to an ‘armed attack.’171

The “inconclusiveness of the evidence” may very well lead one to
see a lack of definitive responsibility on behalf of Iran, thus not
justifying a U.S. response, but responsibility should have nothing to
do with definitively stating that mining a naval vessel is an armed
attack, at least if honestly judged by its scale and effects.172
Because the question of attribution is all the more present in cyberoperations, there must be even more diligence in separating the
analysis of attribution and threshold.173 Reading Nicaragua more
generously than is accurate, Taft asserts in an analysis of Oil Platforms
“[t]here is nothing in the Court’s discussion . . . implying that missile
and mine attacks on naval and commercial vessels are anything less
than an armed attack.”174 Unfortunately, with the creation of “mere
frontier incidents,” that is exactly what the Nicaragua Court claims
the law to be.175
& Tzanakopoulos, supra note 86, at 8–9 (“[T]he Court has referred, almost
constantly, to the concept of aggression, and particular to . . . GA Resolution
3314 . . . What becomes clear is that the Court considers the concepts of armed
attack and aggression to be at least cognate.”).
170. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6)
(separate opinion by Simma, J.).
171. Id. ¶ 72.
172. Id.
173. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 111 (describing the importance of attribution
for states to use counter-measures).
174. William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE
J. INT’L L. 295, 302 (2004) [hereinafter Taft, Self-Defense].
175. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).

2021]

SELF-DEFENSE TO CYBER FORCE

725

Accepting the courts’ general framing, the test must meet two
separate prongs: first, the Court should determine if the violence
threshold for an armed attack was crossed (using scale and effects);
then, determine if the attack should be attributed to the state (using
effective control).176 So, the question should not be: Does the supply
of arms to the El Salvadorian opposition constitute an armed attack?
Rather, using scale and effects: Do the actions of the El Salvadorian
opposition constitute an armed attack? Then, using effective control:
Should the actions of the El Salvadorian opposition be attributed to
Nicaragua? There is a potential debate over whether a non-state actor
can even commit an armed attack,177 perhaps requiring a reversal of
the order of the two prongs. I am agnostic; however, under the Scale
and Effects School framing, “armed attack” is a gravity question and
should not be confused with responsibility. So regardless of the order
of the application of the test, the analysis must be separate. In some
situations, attribution will be obvious, such as when the military of
State A attacks the military of State B. In more difficult scenarios,
terrorists or hacktivists may be operating from State C with support
from State A, against State B. Under either prong, the test may fail,
but they must be kept apart, analyzed separately, and not comingled.178
Even if one accepts the general textual proposition of the Scale and
Effects School—that there is a gap between Arts. 2(4) and 51, there
should still be further doubts about the logic of the size of that gap
created by the Court in Nicaragua. The Court does attempt to deal
with the language discrepancy between “use of force” and “armed
attack,” but by using wholly created terms like “most grave” and
“mere frontier incident,” 179 the Court seems to be seeking a
176. Id. ¶¶ 115, 195.
177. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 340 (noting that “[w]hether nonState actors may initiate an armed attack as matter of law is the subject of some
controversy”).
178. See Yusuf, supra note 167, at 462 (“[T]he definition of ‘armed attack’ is
itself problematic, because the Court’s evaluation . . . frequently occurs within the
broader discussion of self-defence. Thus, the question necessarily tends toward
whether self-defence was justified, and not just whether an armed attack occurred in
the objective sense of the question.”); see also id., at 463 (“The Court has been
criticized for weakening the prohibition of the use of force, while on the other hand,
it has been accused of undermining the right of self-defence.”).
179. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191.

726

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:4

predetermined bias toward limiting situations justifying self-defense.
Interestingly, while not congruent with an armed attack, this bias
against seeing force for what it is, is on display in that, “the Court has
never qualified an unlawful use of force as an act of aggression.”180
Silver rejects this framing, attributing the bias, at least of some
scholars favorable of the opinion, toward broadening the gap for nonconventional attacks to a fear of a “slippery slope” to “applying Article
2(4) to measures of economic and political coercion that have
similarly devastating effects.”181 While honestly dealing with the terms
as different, the Court does not honestly deal with any plain language
meaning of the words “armed” or “attack.”182 Admittedly, dictionary
lawyering is always one of the lowest forms, but according to
Merriam-Webster, “armed” means: “furnished with weapons,
also : using or involving a weapon”183; and “attack” means: “to set
upon or work against forcefully.”184 Any reasonable understanding of
these words could easily describe an incident of a scale the Court
would consider a frontier incident.185 Any force of a military nature
should be viewed, definitionally, as an armed attack.
The premise underlying the proposition that some acts of force cannot be
resisted by force in self-defense is that, because the language of Article 51
is not identical to that of Article 2(4), some acts of unlawful force are not
to be regarded as “armed attacks.” That premise is otherwise unsupported
by the language of the Charter, and simply imposes its distinctions on the
180. Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 86, at 5.
181. Silver, supra note 3, at 83 (arguing that it is better to find activities, when
similar to military force in its destructive nature, fall into the scope of Article 2(4)).
182. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195.
183. See
Armed,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/armed?src=search-dict-box, (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)
(defining armed).
184. See
Attack,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/attack (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (defining attack).
185. See SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA art. 13 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN
REMO MANUAL] (noting that the San Remo Manual appears careful to avoid the
term “use of force” instead using simply the term “attack,” which it defines as
“an act of violence, whether in offence or in defence,” seeming to be closer to how
both the Court in Nicaragua and the Tallinn Manual would define “use of force,”
lending further support to the notion that a better definition of “armed attack” is
simply “an armed act of violence,” rather than including the addition of a gravity
requirement).
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plain language of Article 51, which in no way limits itself to especially
large, direct or important armed attacks. The Court itself offered nothing
that ameliorates the arbitrariness of its pronouncement. At one point it
erroneously invoked, in a surprising misreading, the General Assembly’s
Definition of Aggression.186

While no scholar advances, nor do I here, but, from a purely
textualist approach, a possible interpretation of the words “armed
attack” is as lower level force term, not higher; or, perhaps, use of the
word “armed” is simply intended to separate armed versus unarmed
force? Whatever one makes of these words, the Court simply created
a gravity requirement in Article 51 that is not present in state practice,
considering that all the Court had jurisdiction to hear was customary
law.187 If there is a gap, as the Court asserts, it is certainly narrower
than claimed.188
ii. Problems with Scale and Effects, as applied
The unreasonably high threshold of the scale and effects test
becomes obvious in the Oil Platform case’s holding, “[e]ven taken
cumulatively, and reserving, as already noted, the question of Iranian
responsibility, these incidents do not seem to the Court to constitute
an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that the Court, [in
Nicaragua] qualified as a ‘most grave’ form of the use of force.” 189
The Court looked at the following:
[T]he mining of the United States-flagged Bridgeton on 24 July 1987; the
mining of the United States-owned Texaco Caribbean on 10 August 1987;
and firing on United States Navy helicopters by Iranian gunboats, and from
the Reshadat oil platform, on 8 October 1987[, . . . finding] the Iran Ajr,
in the act of laying mines in international waters some 50 nautical miles
north-east of Bahrain.190

186. Hargrove, supra note 49, at 139.
187. Id. at 299–300.
188. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 100 (agreeing that that there is an intentional
gap between Arts. 2(4) and 51, but that “the gap has to be quite narrow, insomuch
as ‘there is very little effective protection against states violating the prohibition of
the use of force, as long as they do not resort to an armed attack’”).
189. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6)
(separate opinion by Simma, J.).
190. Id. ¶ 66.
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These events cumulatively did not rise to an armed attack. Another
U.S. flagged tanker struck with a Silkworm missile was also not
considered an armed attack.191 This simply cannot be; “there is no
support in international law or practice for the suggestion that missile
and mine attacks carried out by a State’s regular armed forces on
civilian or military targets of another State do not trigger a right of
self-defense.”192 One could accept that the language of the Charter
creates the claimed gap, but the threshold for an “armed attack”
definitionally cannot exclude clear acts of war, the likes of those both
Courts excluded.193
When conventional force is used by regular militaries,
responsibility is unlikely to be unclear, but in the cyber domain, much
like irregular or guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua state responsibility will
likely be the most challenging factual and legal analysis. 194 That is
why, if following the scale and effects test, the gravity analysis must
be fully separated from the responsibility analysis. While seemingly
obvious, it also seems that neither the Courts in Nicaragua nor Oil
Platforms did so, instead looking at the acts that would lead to
responsibility and judging if those acts constituted sufficient
gravity.195 Again, “the mere supply [of arms] . . . does not in itself
amount to a use of force.”196 While this assertion is correct, framing
the question as such mixes gravity with responsibility. 197 Because of
the possibility of hidden responsibility through the use of “hacktivist
groups” or even cyber soldiers of fortune and the ability to co-opt
computers from one or more third states, the state responsibility
analysis will be incredibly situational and fact specific, thereby
beyond the scope of this writing.198 However, it is unthinkable to
imagine any state believing there was opinio juris or acting in a
manner where they could not respond with sufficient force to stop
191. Id. ¶ 64.
192. Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 302.
193. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 100 (explaining that the gap is created because
illegal uses of force are not always equal to armed attacks between states).
194. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).
195. Id. ¶ 228.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶ 115.
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enemy soldiers on one side of a border checkpoint shooting at soldiers
on the other side—what the Court in Nicaragua might label only a
frontier incident.199
Despite claiming in the Tallinn Manual and in Nicaragua that scale
and effects should be an effects-based, not means-based analysis,
applied by the IGE and the Netherlands, there is an inherent bias
against non-kinetic means because the effects the Scale and Effects
School looks for are death and destruction.200 Inherently, the means of
cyber operations, the use and manipulation of data, and, equally, the
presumed desired effects, such as Stuxnet, stock market crashes, and
the 2017 Estonia attacks, do not produce the type of effects (death and
bomb-like physical destruction) of the Scale and Effects School. 201 A
better application would be to look at the scale and effects, not in
physical terms, as the Manual disclaims yet still seeks, but in overall
terms.202 There may be large-scale invasions that, while causing
numerous casualties, are easily repulsed, but do not produce the scale
and effects in terms of national risk and damage created by an
economic-targeted cyber-attack. While the Court in Oil Platforms fails
to conclusively hold that the mining of a single warship would
constitute an armed attack, it is likely that Iran saw the scale and
effects of the Stuxnet operation as far more strategically damaging. 203
The Government of the Netherlands letter’s use of the word
“consequences” is possibly the better framing of the Court’s scale and
effects test.204
199. Id. ¶ 195.
200. Id.; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 340–41; see Dinstein, supra note
32, at 103 (“A [cyber-attack] can qualify as an armed attack just as a much as a
kinetic attack bringing about the same—or similar—results. The crux of the matter
is not the medium at hand . . . but the violent consequences of the action taken.”);
see also Silver, supra note 3, at 88 (discussing Michael Schmitt’s differentiation
between “instrument-based” and what will ultimately become the effects-based test
found in the Tallinn Manual).
201. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342–43.
202. See Silver, supra note 3, at 88.
203. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6)
(separate opinion by Simma, J.).
204. See Netherlands Letter, supra note 101. But see, Michael N. Schmitt,
Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on
a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 911 (1999). (“In fact,
the international community is not directly concerned with the particular coercive
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VII. HOW TO BETTER THINK ABOUT SCALE
AND EFFECTS OF CYBER OPERATIONS.
Here, one cannot ignore a fundamental disagreement within the
Scale and Effects School regarding the view of physical effects for an
armed attack.205 Without constructing an artificial strawman, clearly
only some of the IGE “took the position that harm to physical damage
or property is a condition precedent to the characterization of an
incident as an armed attack.”206 For this group, the assertion that their
test is “effects”-based, is in name only.207 Writing elsewhere, regarding
the targeting of civilian objects, the Manual discusses what the IGE
considers to be an object: “The majority of the [IGE] agreed that the
law of armed conflict notion of ‘object’ is not to be interpreted as
including data.”208 In agreement with the International Committee of
the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) definition of “object” as “visible and
tangible in the 1987 Commentary to Additional Protocols of 1977,”209
the Manual continues:
Therefore, an attack on data per se does not qualify as an attack. They [the
majority of the IGE] agreed, however, that, . . . a cyber operation targeting
data may sometimes qualify as an attack when the operation affects the
functionality of cyber infrastructure or results in other consequences that
would qualify the cyber operation as an attack.210

Admittedly, the minority of the IGE disagreed.211 While it is not
noted how individual members of the IGE “voted,” it stems to reason
that there was a high degree of overlap between those who saw data
instrumentality used (force in this case), but rather the consequences of its use.
However, it would prove extraordinarily difficult to qualify consequences in a
normative practical manner. Undesirable consequences fall along a continuum, but
how could the criteria for placement along it be clearly expressed?”).
205. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 437.
209. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949 633 (1987) [hereinafter, ICRC Commentaries to Additional
Protocols]; see also Dinstein, supra note 32, at 102 (“The likelihood of a [cyberattack] ever constituting a full-fledged armed attack would be scant.”).
210. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 437.
211. Id.
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as not an object also saw a requirement of physical damage for an
armed attack.212 There are two better ways, while using the built-in
logic of the Tallinn Manual, to apply the scale and effects test.213 First,
the simplest, and most realistic, application is that data is a physical
object.214 Second, even if data is not considered an object, the test
should clearly include, and value appropriately, non-physical effects
of cyber operations.215 Regardless of which path one takes, one should
end up at a more appropriate and defensible position.216
First, taking the position that data is an object certainly simplifies
some of the tortured logic of the scale and effects analysis as applied
by the Tallinn Manual.217 The most obviously problematic scenario is
a cyber-attack on a stock exchange that causes wide-spread financial
damage, perhaps even crippling the nation, without causing any
physical damage—the very scenario both the Tallinn Manual and the
Government of the Netherlands appeared conflicted over.218 If digital
data is an object, clearly destroying the data that made up a stock
market would reach the scale and effects of an armed attack. 219
Whether data is an object is mostly a conceptual question.220 There are
two main reasons why data should be viewed as an object: first,
literally, and second, practically.221
From the most purely literal and technical perspective, although we
talk about data as though it as an amorphous non-spatial form that is
everywhere and nowhere, this assumption is not true.222 Despite its

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 334.
216. See, e.g., Michael J. Adams, A Warning About Tallinn 2.0 . . . Whatever it
Says, LAWFARE (Jan. 4, 2017, 8:30AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/warningabout-tallinn-20-%E2%80%A6-whatever-it-says (identifying the same issue with
the data-as-object question contained in the Tallinn Manual).
217. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 333.
218. Id. at 343.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 416.
221. See
Top
5
Things
the
Cloud
is
Not,
WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2012/06/top-5-things-the-cloud-is-not/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2021); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342.
222. See Wired, supra note 221.
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highly movable and transferable state, data is somewhere.223 Your term
paper, your family photo, every individual’s stock holdings, and the
United States’ nuclear launch codes are made up of millions of
individual bits that are present on some data storage device,
somewhere.224 What destruction of data looks like is the rearrangement
of those bits, making them unreadable and therefore unusable.225 In a
highly literal sense, this destruction is no different than the destruction
of a building: the elemental building blocks are physically rearranged
making them unrecognizable.226 Likewise, when a missile hits its
target, the underlying matter is not gone: its fundamental elements,
made up of stone, bricks, and metal beams, are still there, but like the
altered data, they are rearranged into an unusable state.227 Data might
not “go boom” in the same way, but it is still physically changed (i.e.
destroyed).228 Contrary to the Manual and the ICRC’s claims, data and
the underlying bits it is comprised of, are physical.229
One need not go down that literal path to still see the relevance of
considering data as no different than physical objects.230 Assuming,
arguendo that data is not purely physical in the technical sense, it is
still appropriate to not distinguish it from conventional objects or see
a physical damage requirement for an armed attack.231 First and
foremost, doing so would involve returning to a means-based test,
which would come to the illogical conclusion that rendering hardware
on a single computer inoperable might constitute an armed attack,
whereas destroying the data constituting a stock market without

223. Id.
224. What are Bits, Bytes, and Other Units of Measure for Digital Information?,
IND. U., https://kb.iu.edu/d/ackw (last modified Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Measures
for Digital Information].
225. Chris
Woodford,
Hard
Drives,
EXPLAIN
THAT
STUFF,
https://www.explainthatstuff.com/harddrive.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2020).
226. See Kayla Matthews, What Role Does Data Destruction Play in
Cybersecurity?,
MALWAREBYTES
LABS
(Jan.
7,
2020),
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/business-2/2019/09/what-role-does-datadestruction-play-in-cybersecurity/.
227. Id.
228. Matthews, supra note 226.
229. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 209, at 633.
230. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342.
231. Id.
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physical effect would not be considered an armed attack.232 Article 52
of Additional Protocol I to the Genève Conventions of 1949 (API),
and the ICRC’s Commentary thereof,233 while not directly on point for
defining the scope of an armed attack, but reasonably relied on by the
Tallinn Manual,234 separated military and civilian objects from
objectives.235 Article 47 of the Draft Protocol contained, as recounted
in the ICRC Commentary, 236 a non-exhaustive list of civilian objects,
“such as houses, dwellings, installations and means of transport, and
all objects which are not military objectives.”237 The intent of Article
52 of API was not to imply that non-physical objects could be
attacked, but in 1977, one would have no conception of what attack
upon a non-physical object could look like without physical effects.238
With this pre-digital lens in mind, it is no wonder that in the year
1500, the dominant maritime power of the day, and active rule-maker
of customary international maritime law, the United Kingdom, would
have seen a blockade as an act of war.239 Also, why destruction or
seizure of the Dutch spice fleet was so clearly a national threat to the
Netherlands.240 The mercantile fleets were the instruments of national
power, commerce, communication, and empire;241 centuries and
countless advancements later, the internet has become this
irreplaceable instrument for commerce and financial institutions
today.242 Further, with the development of precision guided munitions
232. Id. at 343.
233. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 209, at 26.
234. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 416.
235. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I)
art. 52(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
236. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 209, at 633.
237. Id.
238. Additional Protocol I, supra note 235, art. 52(1).
239. See generally Karl Zemanek, Was Hugo Grotius Really in Favour of the
Freedom of the Seas?, 1 J. HIST. INT’L L. 48 (1999).
240. Id.; see also A Taste of Adventure, ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 1998),
https://www.economist.com/unknown/1998/12/17/a-taste-of-adventure.
241. Zemanek, supra note 239.
242. JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXBURGH, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE
GREAT TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
PROSPERITY
1–2
(2011),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Technology%20Media
%20and%20Telecommunications/High%20Tech/Our%20Insights/The%20great%
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and the ability to conduct precise lower collateral death and injury
bombing, while the law did not change, the reasonableness of efforts
of distinction and proportionality may have.243 With development of
cyber weapons, the law should be no different. Would the destruction
of the East India Company’s annual trade on the docks of Portsmouth
or the burning of all the stock certificates in New York or the forcible
theft of all the gold in Fort Knox by another state be seen as an armed
attack? The answer is clearly yes. 244 A pre-cyber thinker might not
have been able to imagine a means of commerce, communication,
logistics, and warfare that was more valuable in terms of money,
power, and national importance than most physical objects.
Nonetheless, children who have grown up never knowing the preinternet world do not share this problem of being unable to see the
“virtual” world as one-in-the-same as the physical world.245 Is it any
different for someone to take physical dollars from your pocket or
drain your savings account, stealing your electronic dollars? No.
When those of us that grew up before the internet are gone, perhaps
even sooner, this notion of a distinction will seem quaint.246
Regardless of which approach one takes, one should end up in the
same place, viewing data as an object.247 While the first argument—
that data is made up of bits that are physical things—might seem
hyper-technical, the counterargument that an armed attack can only
occur against physical objects is conversely hyper-technical, in the
20transformer/MGI_Impact_of_Internet_on_economic_growth.pdf.
243. Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their
Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a Country Obligated to Use Precision
Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 109, 118–19 (1992).
244. While exceeding the scope of this writing, it is interesting to consider the
question of whether to treat “ransomware,” the act of holding data hostage, as digital
damage or perhaps closer to blockade-like actions? See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism
and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 41, 47–9 (2002) (arguing that acts of terrorism like the September 11 attack on
the United States should be perceived as armed attacks, relying partially on the
economic component).
245. See AARON SMITH, JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON & LEE RAINIE, PEW RSCH.
CTR., THE FUTURE OF MONEY: SMARTPHONE SWIPING IN THE MOBILE AGE (Apr. 17,
2012), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2012/04/17/main-findings-the-futureof-money/.
246. Id.
247. TALLIN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 343, 437.
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extreme. Assumedly, the limited definition of an “object” from the
ICRC’s Commentaries to the Additional Protocols was meant to
exclude more ephemeral notions, such as people’s morale, ideals,
love, joy, happiness, etc.248 If that was the intent, then I agree, abstract
notions cannot per se be considered objects that are attacked. But if
attacks on the banks, telephone lines, letter carriers, stock trading
floors of the past would constitute an attack, then there is no difference
with their cyber equivalents.249 Provided that data is an object, and
purely digital damage alone could constitute an armed attack, 250 still
does not answer the ultimate problem with the Scale and Effects
School: where is the threshold between a simple use of force and an
armed attack?251
Accepting arguendo again, that there is a gap between Articles 2(4)
and 51, and the scale and effects test defines that gap, the totality of
the “consequences”252 should be considered in the differentiation.
Admittedly, only economic means, without an underlying use of force,
could never be violative of Article 2(4).253 But, presumably, to the
Court in Nicaragua one soldier firing across a border and striking a
tree in another country would be a use of force, but not an armed
attack.254 Conversely, a missile strike that caused no deaths or injuries,
yet knocked out an entire country’s or region’s telecommunication
network would be an armed attack.255 The consequences of the use of
force make the difference.256 But the Scale and Effects School
struggles to draw this line clearly in the cyber domain.257 First, as
discussed, is the unreasonable size of the gap, as seen in the Oil
248. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 209, at 633.
249. Id.
250. TALLIN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342–43.
251. Id. at 332, 341.
252. See Netherlands Letter, supra note 101; see also Schmitt, supra note 204, at
911–12.
253. Schmitt, supra note 204, at 909 (“A temporary and spatially limited border
incursion is probably a lesser threat to either international peace and security or the
right of states to conduct their affairs free from outside interference than was the
1973-1974 Arab oil embargo.”).
254. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 228 (June 27).
255. Id. ¶ 191.
256. Id. ¶ 195.
257. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 341.
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Platforms case;258 second, assuming the gap, the Tallinn Manual
undervalues cyber damage.259
All cyber-attacks are not the same. But thinking about how various
attacks cause harm is helpful to better classify how to think about
them.260 Analyzing the following three comparisons of conventional
means, where there might be some agreement, may help unpack
questions about how to conceive of the consequences: electronic
jamming versus destroying communication networks; economic
sanctions versus blockades; and espionage versus sabotage.261
There might be greater consensus that the former in each group
would not constitute an armed attack, or potentially even use of force,
whereas the latter of each dyad would.262 Thus, when asking whether
a cyber operation is more like the former or the latter, the answer also
reveals whether a cyber operation likewise justifies or does not justify
self-defense. The more closely the damage resembles that “resulting
from the use of traditional weaponry is likely to be viewed as a use of
force under Article 2(4);”263 however, as cyber weapons become more
commonplace, notions of what “traditional weaponry” is must be
expanded.264
First, “A [cyber-attack] is often defined inadequately as disrupting,
denying, degrading, or destroying either information resident in a
computer network or the network itself.”265 In reality, the use of
258. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6)
(separate opinion by Simma, J.).
259. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 330.
260. See Silver, supra note 3, at 76–77 (providing a non-exhaustive list of four
types of cyber operations, “(i) extracting the information held in the target computer
(espionage); (ii) disseminating information through the adversary’s information
network in order to deceive the adversary or stimulate political instability; (iii)
preparing the battlespace by incapacitating the adversary’s command, control, and
communication capabilities; (iv) causing property damage, physical injury, or death
by manipulating infrastructure or operational systems controlled by the target
computer.”).
261. See id. at 85.
262. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 336.
263. Silver, supra note 3, at 85.
264. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross Geneva, A Guide to the Legal Review of New
Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 931, 937 (2006).
265. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 102.

2021]

SELF-DEFENSE TO CYBER FORCE

737

electronic jamming or electronic warfare can take many forms. 266 The
most common involves using electronic signatures to hide or disguise
ships or aircraft.267 It would also be possible to broadcast such wide
radio frequencies to interrupt all forms of communication that use a
radio frequency, thereby severely limiting a state’s ability to
communicate.268 On the opposite side of this spectrum would be the
actual physical destruction of telecommunication hubs, effectively
stopping all electronic communication.269 However, the Charter
specifically cites, “[t]hese may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations,” as not uses of force when employed by the Security
Council.270 While, the use of jamming or broadcasting into a state may
very well be illegal, The UN Convention of the Law of Sea
(UNCLOS), for example, makes unauthorized broadcasts from the
high seas unlawful, going so far as to give jurisdiction for prosecution
(among other states) to “any State where authorized radio
communication is suffering interference.”271 If the duration is limited,
and effects small, jamming might not even rise to the level of a use of
force, whereas a missile strike upon communication hubs that cuts off
all communication, destroys systems, and takes large efforts should

266. See id.
267. See Kris Osborn, Revealed: The US Military’s Electronic War Strategy to
Counter Russia, NAT’L INT. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/revealed-the-us-militarys-electronic-war-strategy-counter18644#:~:text=US%20MilitaryPolitics-,
Revealed%3A%20The%20US%20Military’s%20Electronic%20War%20Strategy
%20to%20Counter%20Russia,electromagnetic%20spectrum%20to%20attack%2
0enemies.
268. See John Keller, DARPA Seeks to Ensure Radio Communications and
Networking Reliability in Jamming and Interference, MIL. & AEROSPACE ELECS.
(Jan.
8,
2018),
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/computers/article/16726529/darpa-seeks-toensure-radio-communications-and-networking-reliability-in-jamming-andinterference.
269. See Schmitt, supra note 204, at 888 (explaining the various ways that cyberattacks are conducted).
270. U.N. Charter art. 41; see also Schmitt, supra note 204, at 912.
271. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 109, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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clearly be an armed attack.272 For a cyber-operation that attacks
communication systems, what are the effects or consequences? If the
duration goes beyond the momentary, into the days, weeks, months;
the effect is near total, such as preventing a government from being
able to communicate within its system, as in Estonia in 2007, and/or
the damage is permanent or takes large scale digital efforts to repair,
then the cyber-operation tends to have consequences that are much
closer to that of a missile strike on communications hubs and should
likewise be considered an armed attack.273
Under the scale and effects test, since the means are (purportedly)
unimportant, one must look only at the effects.274 If the effects are
essentially equal, the destruction of a communication system by
physically destroying telephone wires or corrupting data to a point
where the non-physical infrastructure would need to be “repaired”
digitally, then both should constitute armed attacks.275
The second comparison is economic pressure versus a blockade.276
Generally, economic pressures, such as sanctions, tariffs, and trade
policy, are not viewed as force prohibited by Article 2(4).277 “At the
1945 UN Charter drafting conference in San Francisco, States
considered and rejected a proposal to include economic coercion as a
use of force.”278 Likewise, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
272. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 107
(2000) (finding that acts of self-defense only warrant countermeasures that are
proportional and necessary to respond to an armed attack).
273. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 105 (finding that the outcome of a cyberattack is more telling than the method used in order to justify self-defense).
274. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 340 (“[W]hether a cyber
operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and effects.”); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 72
(1996).
275. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 340.
276. See discussion infra part I.
277. See Silver, supra note 3, at 80 (explaining that economic coercion is not
considered a threat of force amongst scholars, yet the discourse is readily evolving);
see also Schmitt, supra note 204, at 908 (“[T]he concept of the use of force is
generally understood to mean armed force.”).
278. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 331; 6 Documents of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization 331, 334 U.N. Doc. 784 I/1/27
(June 5,1945); 3 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization 251, 252–53 U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(e)(4) (May 6, 1945).

2021]

SELF-DEFENSE TO CYBER FORCE

739

rejected “all forms of pressure, including those of a political or
economic character” as constituting force.279 In contrast, a blockade
has historically been seen a use of force by belligerents, 280 and
certainly, if more than momentary, should be seen as an armed
attack.281 In UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, the Assembly,
cited a “blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces
of another State” as an act of aggression.282 The Statute of the
International Criminal Court further includes blockade in its definition
of the crime of aggression.283 Further, “[a] majority of the [IGE]
concluded that it is reasonable to apply the law of blockade to
operations designed to block cyber communications.”284 While the
analogy to a blockade is imperfect, a blockade traditionally
necessitates a threat of physical force in order to effectuate.285 If cyber
weapons are weapons, and a cyber-attack has occurred that effectually
inhibits a state’s ability to conduct commerce, a cyber blockade is not
a threat of force, but an effectuated use of force. 286 Therefore, while
some would incorrectly see a blockade as “more forceful” because of
the future threat of physical force, they would be incorrect, since a
“cyber blockade” involves a completed use of force.287
There is a fundamental difference between a widespread, persistent
denial of service attack, such as 2007 Estonia attack, and normal
economic measures.288 First, sanctions, tariffs, or adverse trade policy
279. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 331.
280. See James F. McNulty, Blockade: Evolution and Expectation, 62 INT’L L.
STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COLL. 172, 172 (1980) (noting that maritime blockades
are internationally recognized as a lawful state action); see generally SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 185, arts. 93–104 (detailing blockade guidelines in an attempt
to modernize respective maritime naval discourse).
281. See id. arts. 93–104.
282. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(c) (Nov. 12, 1974).
283. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8bis 2(c), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
284. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 385, 505.
285. See Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFFS.
550, 552 (1963) (“[T]he carriage of offensive weapons, against which it was
directed, was something other than ordinary maritime commerce.”).
286. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 329–30.
287. See RUSSELL, supra note 69, at 149 (finding that physical blockades share
many of the same characteristics of cyber-attacks).
288. See id. (explaining how the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia created widespread
disruption on daily tasks conducted by the government and many private sector
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are likely, absent treaty violation, lawful and not even a use of force. 289
On the other hand, even a short or partial blockade, in terms of location
or type of goods, could rise to an armed attack.290 For instance,
Kennedy’s month-long self-styled “quarantine” of Cuba, preventing
only “offensive weapons,” likely was an armed attack.291 Israel used
the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967 as one of actions
justifying self-defense.292 Again, to accept the position of the scale and
effects test, were a cyber-attack that had the same scale and effects as
a physical blockade that would rise to the level of an armed attack,
then the cyber-attack should be viewed likewise an armed attack.293
An interesting, related scenario would be massive monetary
counterfeiting, effectively devaluing another state’s currency. 294
Counterfeiting would certainly be unlawful, as a violation of another
state’s sovereignty, but not a use of force.295 While an unlikely, and
highly particular, kind of cyber-attack, it is interesting to consider how
to classify an attack that would put hundreds of thousands of dollars
in to everyone’s account, rather than making their accounts
inaccessible—thus causing mass devaluation.296 The digital damage
businesses).
289. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 331, 336 (describing how
definitions of “threat of force” have evolved over time, yet prohibition of commerce
with other states does not fit under the “threat of force” umbrella).
290. See generally SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 185, arts. 93–104.
291. See Chayes, supra note 285, at 550 (equating the Kennedy administration’s
naval blockade of Cuba following their acquisition of Soviet missiles to an armed
attack).
292. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 101–03 (2002) (“[I]t ‘could of course, be argued
that the Egyptian blockade itself constituted the use of force, thus legitimizing Israeli
actions without the need for ‘anticipatory’ conceptions of self-defense.’”).
293. See RUSSELL, supra note 69, at 62, 63 (stating that cyber-attacks share many
of the same characteristics as physical blockades, yet do not justify the use of force
as a response).
294. See Bruce G. Carruthers & Melike Arslan, Sovereignty, Law, and Money:
New Developments, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 521, 527 (2019) (showing how
counterfeiting an enemy nation’s currency with the intention to destabilize its
economy was largely ignored by international enforcement organizations prior to the
twentieth century).
295. See id. at 521.
296. See Silver, supra note 3, at 82, 87 (finding that cyber-attacks have the
potential to cripple target economies, and thus should be considered under the
jurisdiction of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter).
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done by forcing entry into the bank’s security system might be enough
to constitute force rising to an armed attack, but such an attack appears
to be closer to counterfeiting than an armed attack.297
Ultimately, the quantity of commerce that is conducted over the
internet and the scale of globalization only increase the consequences
of closing another state off from the rest of the world.298 Since the
damage could be equivalent, if not greater, to a traditional blockade,
thus raising the consequences, a modern “cyber blockade” should be
considered an armed attack.299
Espionage versus sabotage is another interesting comparison. Like
cyber-operations, state responsibility will always be in doubt with
espionage and sabotage.300 As provided in the American television
program Mission Impossible “As always, should you or any
of your IM Force be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow any
knowledge of your actions,”301 governments will deny involvement
when they get caught.302 While the actual perpetrators of espionage are
clearly committing domestic crimes, often under the cover of
diplomatic immunity,303 pure espionage is a generally and
begrudgingly tolerated practice by most states,304 and rarely seen as a
use of force justifying self-defense.305 Dinstein would classify
espionage as “merely unfriendly acts.”306 Whereas pure espionage
297. Id.
298. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 105 (explaining that the currently rising
reliance on technology could expose State vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks).
299. Id.
300. See Asaf Lubin, The Liberty to Spy, 61 HARV. INT’L L. J. 185, 225 (2020)
([S]tates ‘over-whelmingly refuse to admit responsibility for this conduct, let alone
attempt to justify it as permissible under international law.’”).
301. Mission Impossible: Pilot (CBS television broadcast Sep. 17, 1966).
302. See Lubin, supra note 300, at 225.
303. See generally Nathaniel P. Ward, Espionage and the Forfeiture of
Diplomatic Immunity, 11 INT’L LAW. 657, 657–66 (1977) (“Such a denial of criminal
immunity for espionage would subject the collector to domestic sanctions and serve
as a deterrent against future abuses of privileges and immunities.”).
304. Id.; see also Lubin, supra note 300, at 189 (“[S]tates enjoy a peacetime right
to spy under international law.”).
305. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 105 (finding that acts of espionage generally
do not rise to the level of an armed attack and are often openly recognized by a
State).
306. Id.
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should not be viewed as a use of force, and perhaps not even a
violation of international law.307 Sabotage, such as the act of an
individual entering another country and destroying equipment or
technology, certainly is more likely to be viewed as an unlawful use
of force that justifies self-defense.308 If an effects-based analysis is
what matters, whether a factory is destroyed by sabotage or a missile,
the outcome—a defunct factory—is the same net effect.309 For
espionage purposes, assume that a government used cyber means to
infiltrate a computer system and steal state secrets in a second country;
this is likely an unlawful act, but it does not appear to even rise to the
level of a use of force.310 Assume that, similar to the Stuxnet
operation,311 a government infiltrated a computer system to destroy
another state’s capability to make a certain weapon system; this act,
like conventional sabotage, is certainly a use of force and would
produce effects that should be considered an armed attack.312

VIII. PRESCRIPTIVE PROBLEMS
Despite the Tallinn Manual explicitly limiting itself to a descriptive
analysis,313 a question that must be considered remains: is the scale and

307. See id. at 101 (finding that merely unfriendly acts—such as espionage—does
not trigger countermeasures in any accepted norm of international law); see also
Episode 158: What SCOTUS Can Learn from Franklin Barbecue, NAT’L SEC. L.
PODCAST,
at
32:00
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/episode-158-what-scotus-can-learnfrom-franklin-barbecue/ (stating that U.S. Department of Defense does not consider
military cyber-attacks as a violation of international law—much like espionage).
308. Silver, supra note 3, at 87, 88; see generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
18–37 (1942) (holding that acts of sabotage and physical destruction of American
war industries by German Reich spies is a violation of international law).
309. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 102–03 (“The crux of the matter is not the
medium at hand . . . but the violent consequences of the action taken.”).
310. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 335.
311. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 UNIV. MIA. L.
REV. 761, 787, 789 (2018) (explaining that Stuxnet was a sophisticated computer
virus aimed to disrupt Iranian development of nuclear weapons).
312. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 336, 415; Dinstein, supra note 32, at
101.
313. See id. at 2–4 (explaining that the Tallinn Manual is presented by
international law experts as commentary on the law as it exists).
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effects test, as applied, desirable? The answer is clearly no. 314 As the
Charter-is-Dead School accurately confronts, the Security Council
system for dealing with unlawful uses of force is likely irretrievably
broken.315 Complaining to the UNSC is unlikely to produce an
acceptable result for states that are victims of conventional or cyber
force.316 The Scale and Effects School would leave an unacceptable
gap constituting unlawful force short of an armed attack that would
not allow states to use force, even as the only available means to
defend themselves.317 Whatever one makes of the confusing language
in Article 51 – “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . “318 –it
cannot mean that states are left without the ability to exercise selfdefense in response to unlawful force.
This interpretation, as the Scale and Effects School would advance,
makes most states lawbreakers, only further tilting the world toward
the Charter-is-Dead School.319 Assumedly, however, proponents of the
scale and effects test still believe that this is or should be the law
governing the use of force.320 The only way one can reconcile the logic
of the Court in Nicaragua is by having a belief that the Court’s framing
would produce less force not more, a laudable objective.321 While the
judgment of the court might have some deterrent effect on some states
to refrain from using force in self-defense, it has the opposite effect on
aggressor states (the very states we should worry about) that would
choose to use force, albeit short of an armed attack, more often.322 This
effect is only truer in the cyber domain.323 Applying the Tallinn
314. Id.
315. Id. at 330–31; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161,
¶ 6 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.).
316. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 330–31.
317. Id.
318. UN Charter, art. 51.
319. See generally FRANCK, supra note 292, at 53–68 (explaining how terrorism
is an excellent predictor of both how states will respond to cyber-attacks and the
incredible difficulty in assigning blame).
320. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 333 (stating that the Nicaragua
judgment founded the scale-and-effects test).
321. See generally FRANCK, supra note 292, at 53–68.
322. Id. at 62.
323. See Davis, supra note 29.
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Manual’s framing might make some states less likely to use force in
self-defense against cyber operations, thereby incentivizing aggressor
states to use cyber means short of an armed attack, without the fear of
conventional force in response, especially if the aggressor state is a
permanent member of the UNSC.324 “Lawfare” would also incentivize
starting conflicts in the cyber domain, because while the aggressor
state might be called a lawbreaker, if the aggressor could goad the
victim into responding with force, physical or cyber, it would make
lawbreakers of both parties.325
So-called “pin-prick” or “accumulation of events” attacks highlight
this problem.326 “Pin prick” attacks would be a “series of cyber
incidents that individually fall below the threshold of an armed
attack.”327 The Tallinn Manual, correctly, would generally treat “the
incidents as a composite armed attack,” i.e., judged collectively.328 But
the idea of pin prick attacks raises an interesting question: Under the
extremely high scale and effects test, what if there is a long,
continuous use of relatively minor attacks that never rise to an armed
attack? Under the Scale and Effects School, this would conceptually
allow aggressor states to perpetually pick away at another state
forever, without the fear of recourse.329
As shown, the scale and effects test struggles in every way to
discuss the law: predictively, descriptively, and prescriptively. 330
Despite being the dominate view, it does not reflect how states will
behave, what the law is, or what it should be.331 The School does
attempt to deal with clear drafting and interpretation problems of the

324. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 330–31.
325. Id.
326. See GRAY, supra note 132, at 107 (explaining how a single use of force may
not warrant lawful countermeasures, however, a series of collective uses of force
may amount to an armed attack deserving of self-defense).
327. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342; Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109.
328. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342.
329. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109.
330. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 342.
331. See Papawadee Tanodomdej, The Tallinn Manuals and the Making of the
International Law on Cyber Operations, 13 MASARYK U. J. L. & TECH. 67, 82
(2019) (discussing the challenges of certain pedagogical debates in international
law).
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UN Charter,332 but the solution advanced by the Court in Nicaragua,
adopted by the Tallinn Manual, and made into government policy by
the Netherlands fails to be an accurate or workable description of the
law of self-defense.333

IX.

FORCEFUL COUNTERMEASURES SCHOOL

The Forceful Countermeasures School is an attempt to deal with
many of the criticisms of the Scale and Effects School. 334
Fundamentally, this School starts with the same interpretation of the
language and gap created by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter,
specifically the differentiation between the terms “use of force” and
“armed attack” that all armed attacks consist of uses of force, but not
every use of force rises to the level of an armed attack. 335 Similarly,
many from this School would adopt the scale and effects test from
Nicaragua.336 Unlike the Scale and Effects School, as I have defined
it, the Forceful Countermeasures School would see the use of forceful
countermeasures, in response to unlawful uses of force, as lawful.337
Countermeasures, generally, would be any act (forceful or not) that
would on its own be unlawful, but are permissible in response to an
unlawful act, in an attempt to return an aggressor state to lawful

332. See id. (describing the imbalance and questionable authority as a result of
“opaque drafting processes” that leads to disharmony within the school of thought).
333. See Michael Sang, Legal Regulation of Cyber Warfare: Reviewing the
Contribution of the Tallinn Manual to the Advancement of International Law 48
(Feb. 2015) (M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Cape Town) (on file with OpenUCT),
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/15201/thesis_law_2015_sang_micha
el_kipkemei.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (stating that there is a general lack of
clarity in the Tallinn Manual to explain how states can respond to cyber-attacks,
which ultimately “diminishes its practical utility”).
334. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Drawbacks and Dangers of Active Defense, 6
INT’L. CONF. CYBER CONFLICT 39, 44 (2014) (explaining how multiple terms in the
U.N. Charter have different interpretations by different legal institutions in
international law).
335. See id. (defining the solution set forth in Nicaragua as requiring “justified
armed attacks under Article 51” to be only in response to those initial attacks that
constitute the “most grave forms of the use of force”).
336. See id. at 45 (arguing that the Forceful Countermeasures school of thought
is increasingly popular for cyber warfare).
337. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 107 (describing an example of an armed
attack in cyber warfare).
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behavior.338 The real split between the Scale and Effects School and
the Forceful Countermeasures School is not whether countermeasures
writ large are lawful, but whether countermeasures may involve
force.339 For example, a majority of the IGE agree that generally
countermeasures could be applied in response to cyber uses of force,
but only a minority would see a forceful countermeasure as lawful.340
Confusingly, the court in Nicaragua while setting a surprisingly
high bar for when self-defense would be permissible, seems to hold
out the possibility of forceful countermeasures: “analogous to the right
of collective self-defence in the case of an armed attack, but both the
act which gives rise to the reaction, and that reaction itself, would in
principle be less grave.”341 A relevant difference is that there would
not be lawful collective countermeasures: there is not “the right of a
third State to resort to force in response to the wrongful act.” 342
Although there is support for countermeasures even within the
Nicaragua judgment,343 the judgment itself is unclear if they would
only be limited, non-forceful countermeasures.344 Judge Simma
338. See id. (explaining how when an armed attack occurs, it is perfectly
legitimate for a state to take action in the name of self-defense).
339. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 339 (distinguishing between an
armed attack and aggression, whereby aggression does not always constate an armed
attack, and therefore, does not entitle a state to a forceful countermeasure); see also
Claus Kreß, The International Court of Justice and the ‘Principle of Non-Use of
Force’, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
561, 562–63 (Marc Weller ed., 2017) (providing an early example of when the ICJ
considered international law and the use of force in the Corfu Channel case); YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 199 (3rd ed., 2004) (explaining
how forcible countermeasures are unlawful if they are taken by a state in response
to an action that never constituted an armed attack).
340. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 125 (“A minority of the Experts
asserted that forcible countermeasures are appropriate in response to a wrongful use
of force. . . .”).
341. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 210 (June 27).
342. DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 175.
343. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 224.
344. See id.; see also Hargrove, supra note 49, at 138 (“The Court strongly
suggested, but so far as I can ascertain did not explicitly assert, that the victim state’s
‘proportional countermeasures’ might themselves include the use of force.”);
Hargrove, supra note 49, at 135, 141–42 (“Either the Court was saying (a) that there
are some acts of force that nobody, not even the victim may resist by proportionate
measures of force; or it was saying (b) that only the victim may resist by force,
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provides the most articulate definition of forceful countermeasures in
his separate opinion in Oil Platforms, using proportionality as the
throttle for forceful responses:
To sum up my view on the use of force/self-defence aspects of the present
case, there are two levels to be distinguished: there is, first, the level of
“armed attacks” in the substantial, massive sense of amounting to “une
agression armée”, to quote the French authentic text of Article 51. Against
such armed attacks, self-defence in its not infinite, but still considerable,
variety would be justified. But we may encounter also a lower level of
hostile military action, not reaching the threshold of an “armed attack”
within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Against
such hostile acts, a State may of course defend itself, but only within a more
limited range and quality of responses (the main difference being that the
possibility of collective self-defence does not arise, cf. Nicaragua) and
bound to necessity, proportionality and immediacy in time in a particularly
strict way.345

Looking only prescriptively, the incredibly high threshold for
armed attack laid out by the Court appears much more reasonable if
forceful countermeasures would be lawful.346 This may have been the
Court attempting to engage in regulating the very grey zone they
created.347
The obvious textual problem with this explanation is that while the
Court is slavishly particular to the language of Article 51’s “armed
attack” threshold,348 there is no textual support for countermeasures,
provided it did so alone. . . . In either case above, the Court would cripple the right
of self-defense the more so in the former than the latter. But in the latter case, it
would in one remarkable stroke manage both to impair the right of self-defense, and
to weaken fundamentally the prohibition on the use of force by creating an openended and wholly new category of exception to Article 2(4).”).
345. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 13 (Nov. 6) (separate
opinion by Simma, J.).
346. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Luncheon
Address at the American Society of International Law 82nd Annual Meeting 420,
426 (Apr. 22, 1988) (asserting that the court in Nicaragua did not consider necessity
and proportionality in its reasoning, which contributed to the illegality of the forceful
countermeasure).
347. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 6.
348. See William C. Banks & Evan J. Criddle, Customary Constraints on the Use
of Force: Article 51 with an American Accent, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 67, 67 (2016)
(explaining that permitting states to “use force only after another state has launched
an ‘armed attack’ of sufficient magnitude to satisfy the event threshold requirement
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forceful or otherwise.349 The sections of the opinion dealing with
countermeasures take the Court even further from the text of the
Charter, effectively creating a “quadruple structure of (i) self-defense
versus (ii) armed attack, and (iii) counter-measures analogous to but
short of self-defense versus (iv) forceable measures short of an armed
attack.”350
Predictively, lawful, forceful countermeasures would alleviate
some of the problems the unrealistically high threshold Scale and
Effects School creates, as forceful countermeasures at least give states
a means to attempt to defend themselves.351 However, a victim state is
more likely to claim (and view) a use of force as an armed attack and
respond with force equivalent to self-defense.352 While Forceful
Countermeasures has some predictive value over the Scale and Effects
School, it is limited at best.353
Descriptively, this School, like the Court in Nicaragua struggles.354
Without any direct textual authorization contained within the Charter,
the Forceful Countermeasures School would rely on “nothing . . . shall
impair” the “inherent right” of “self-defense” from Article 51,
effectively retaining the pre-Charter right of Self-Help, allowing the
use of force called an “armed reprisal.”355 “Reprisals constitute
‘counter-measures that would be illegal if not for the prior illegal act
for responsible military action” is a ‘restrictive’ approach to self-defense).
349. See Hargrove, supra, note 49, at 142 (“This new exception to Article 2(4)—
’forcible countermeasures’—is perhaps only the most obvious specific consequence
of the Court’s treatment of customary law as the law of the case.”).
350. DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 174.
351. See Hathaway, supra note 336, at 48 (referencing Judge Simma in Oil
Platforms, who acknowledged that forceful countermeasures gave states the
opportunity to defend themselves).
352. See Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace:
A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 861,
864 (2012) (arguing that certain cyber operations clear the “requisite level of harm”
to constitute an armed attack and give a state legal leeway to take self-defense
measures).
353. See Hathaway, supra note 336, at 50 (concluding that it would be unrealistic
to make an all-out prohibition on a state using forceful countermeasures in response
to a cyber-attack).
354. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 177 (June 27) (dissenting opinion by Schwebel,
J).
355. See id. ¶ 176.
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of the State against which they are directed.’”356 This doctrine of
reprisals pre-dates the supposed blanket ban on the use of the force in
Article 2(4).357 However, importantly, before the UN Charter, or at
least the Kellogg-Briand Pact 358 there was no general ban on the use
of force,359 so it is hard to see how a right to forceful self-help would
have intentionally survived the purported plain meaning of the
Charter.360 Considering the language of Article 51,361 it is even harder
to imagine the Charter limiting the right of self-defense as the Court
in Nicaragua would,362 while permitting an unmentioned exception to
the quite specific prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). 363
Despite the language of the Court,364 and assuming a bias of the Court
against the use of force, it is hard to imagine the Court intended to
imply that forceful countermeasures are lawful, as doing so would
seem to close one door to the use of force while opening another.365
Alternatively, there may be space in the Forceful Countermeasures
School for what could be called weak-hearted Charter-Is-Dead
scholars, basically those who see significant state practice having
eroded much of the Charter’s language, but still seek to retain some of
its structure.366 One such structural element is how “it appears that
356. DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 194, quoting O. Schachter, International Law
Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I, 9, 168 (1982).
357. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 220 (1977) (explaining how the doctrine of
reprisals will not be thoroughly considered, and that while the lawfulness of reprisals
is dubious, it is still distinct from countermeasures as a reprisal is meant to punish).
358. See General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy art. I–II, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force Jul.
24, 1929) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact] (“The High Contracting Parties agree
that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought
except by pacific means.”).
359. See id. (calling for an outright ban on the use of force to settle a dispute).
360. See DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 194 (concluding that reprisal’s constitute
illegal behavior made legal only because of a prior illegal act of a state).
361. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27).
362. See id. ¶ 193.
363. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
364. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶¶ 224, 248–49.
365. See id.
366. See Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the
United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 945 (2007)
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recourse to self-help remains an option not entirely foreclosed by the
Charter, at least as interpreted by state practice.”367 The problem,
again, with this analysis is that states employing reprisals of this
nature, especially against a use of force long since concluded,
unusually “resort to creative fictions” of self-defense.368 Frequently,
the international community has failed to object to these reprisals,
when there is a sympathetically aggrieved party,369 “lend[ing] further
credence to the thesis that state recourse to force may be tolerated . . .
even when the injury does not rise to the threshold of a ‘armed
attack.’”370 The U.S. response in Libya to the German nightclub
bombing in 1986 is a perfect example of responding with force in
claimed self-defense after the incident justifying self-defense has
ceased.371
Countermeasures may not be as helpful as some would advance.
Importantly, like self-defense (excluding arguments over the use of
preemptive self-defense), countermeasures cannot be reprisals,372 i.e.,
punishment for past actions, but instead efforts to return the aggressor
state to lawful compliance. Dinstein would construe the concept of
immediacy “broadly,” arguing “self-defense countermeasures must

(explaining that under the “Charter is dead” school of theory, because the
international community continues to ignore the Charter’s rules, the Charter’s use of
force rules are subsequently not binding).
367. FRANCK, supra note 292, at 112.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.; see also Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to
Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 1, 14 (1990) (describing a
“growing willingness to use force in certain ‘just’ circumstances” that might not
meet the requisite threshold).
371. See Jeffrey Allen McCredie, The April 14, 1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of
Self-Defense or Reprisal?, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 215, 216 (1987) (providing
an example of the United States making known its intent to use force in response to
the Berlin nightclub bombing, despite the fact that there was no continuance of threat
from the opposing state parties).
372. But see WALZER, supra note 357, at 220 (“Nor is there any evidence that
individual members of the UN, however they vote on ritual occasions, are prepared
to renounce reprisals when lives of their own citizens are at stake. Reprisals are
clearly sanctioned by practice of nations, and the (moral) reason behind the practice
seems as strong as ever.”).
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not be too tardy,”373 but he would permit them later than most.374
The “pin-prick” scenario is again helpful to consider in the forceful
countermeasure context.375 Assume different series of cyber-attacks
that are possibly: a) completed, but do not collectively amount to an
armed attack, b) completed, but none of the attacks individually would
constitute an armed attack, assuming that aggregation of pin-prick
attacks is not permitted, or c) ongoing. Only in category c) would
countermeasures, forceful or not, be authorized.376 But even if
authorized, any action would still be shaped by the fundamental
threshold question of what level of countermeasure force would be
proportional to return the aggressor state to law compliance.377
As a descriptive matter, assuming the language of the Charter is still
good law, it seems much more defensible that Article 2(4) eliminated
forceful countermeasures, regardless of how one views whatever
remains of self-defense.378
Prescriptively, Forceful Countermeasures might at first glance seem
preferable to the Scale and Effects School, in that, at least, forceful
countermeasures would act as a gap-filler to defend against unlawful
force less than an armed attack;379 however, a disjointed, messy system
is all that would remain, and in the cyber domain, all the more so. 380
373. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 110.
374. Id.
375. See Abhimanyu George Jain, Rationalising International Law Rules on SelfDefence: The Pin-Prick Doctrine, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 23, 27
(2014) (“The defensive use of force in this sort of situation may be justified by
reference to the ‘pin-prick’ or ‘accumulation of events’ doctrine. This doctrine
recognizes the existence of a right of self-defense in response to a series of armed
attacks, each possibly falling below the gravity threshold, but together, constituting
a continuing armed attack. . . .”).
376. See id. at 58 (arguing that the court in the Nicaragua decision “implicitly
allowed for the possibility of the pin-prick doctrine”).
377. See id. at 64 (explaining that under the pin-prick doctrine, “the necessity and
proportionality analysis, as well as the gravity analysis, remain the same.”).
378. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force:
The U.N.’s Response to Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L. J. 453, 457 (1991)
(supporting the notion that the Charter is still good law because it has altered how
governments decide to use force for the past one-hundred years).
379. See id. (explaining how when states use force today, they try to put forth a
legal explanation).
380. See Matthew Bey, Great Powers in Cyberspace: The Strategic Drivers
Behind US, Chinese and Russian Competition, 3 CYBER DEF. REV. 31, 31 (2018)
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Under the scale and effects test, the question remains regarding the
threshold of what constitutes an armed attack, a point even the Manual
and the Netherlands struggled to define,381 and states would continue
to violate, while claiming compliance as self-help.382 Forceful
countermeasures would also create a second undefined threshold
question of force “‘analogous’ to but less grave than self-defense.”383
As Dinstein laid out in his “quadruple structure,” forceful
countermeasures in response to unlawful force not rising to an armed
attack could not rise to the level of self-defense. 384 As discussed, there
cannot be self-defense in response to self-defense: someone must have
“started it.”385
Imagine that Estonia could have stopped the 2007 attack with a so
called “hack-back,” only destroying the computer responsible.386
Would that be a lawful countermeasure? Presumably so.387 But what if
Estonia could only stop it with a single missile strike to the building
housing the computer controlling the attack? Presumedly, that would
be a self-defense scale of a response.388 What would be Russia’s lawful
(discribing how the next frontier of critical battlegrounds is cyber warfare and that
the process of developing international norms and treaties will inevitably be
“messy”).
381. See Franck, supra note 10, at 816 (arguing that the Charter provides no
answer for determining whether or not there has been an “armed attack”).
382. See id. (asserting that state practice has destroyed global confidence in
Article 2(4) because of continuous violations).
383. DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 174.
384. Id.
385. See Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 237–38 (acknowledging that there are
pedagogical differences for defining what “just war” is).
386. See Samuli Haataja, The 2007 Cyber Attacks Against Estonia and
International Law on the Use of Force: An Informational Approach, 9 L.,
INNOVATION & TECH. 159, 159–60 (2017) (“In April and May of 2007 Estonia had
become subject to a new form of ‘cyber violence.’ It became the first nation-state
subject to large-scale distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in what was
widely described in the media as a ‘cyber war’ and what Estonia’s President later
depicted as ‘Web War One.’”).
387. See Delbert Tran, Note, The Law of Attribution: Rules for Attributing the
Source of a Cyber-Attack, 20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 376, 399 (2018) (outlining
potential responses a state party can take in response to a cyber-attack).
388. See id. (describing the possible responses to a cyber-attack to include (1)
“negative economic punishment,” (2) “deni[al] of positive benefits” to the state
responsible for the attack, (3) “hack-back countermeasure[s],” (4) “military
response”).
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response if Estonia, in taking a “countermeasure” then escalates the
violence up to what should be considered self-defense, and therefore
to the level of an armed attack? There can be no self-defense to a
lawful action of self-defense, but can there be self-defense in response
to an excessive countermeasure? This all seems better resolved by
proportionality rather than a quadruple subjective structure.389
It is possible that the more complex scheme, with multiple
thresholds, could have something of a circuit breaker effect, stopping
escalation at each threshold.390 But states disregarding and engaging
“creative fictions” of both the aggressive force and counterforce seem
more likely. As one can easily see, allowing the use of force below
self-defense only obfuscates the analysis. If law is to have any
regulatory effect on state behavior, the impact must be clear and have
some connection to reality.391 If the desired end state of the Charter is
the following:
[T]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, 392

then forceful countermeasures work against this goal, not toward it.393
The Forceful Countermeasures School is rooted in a noble goal—
the attempt to limit escalation of interstate violence, while providing
credible remedies to victims of force394—but creates a messy, more
389. See DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 174 (“What emerges is a quadruple
structure of (i) self-defense versus (ii) armed attack, and (iii) counter-measures
analogous to but short of self-defense versus (iv) forcible measures short of an armed
attack.”).
390. See id. (referencing the “quadruple structure”).
391. See FRANCK, supra note 292, at 112 (describing some of the longstanding
problems with use of force that can contribute to escalation of violence).
392. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
393. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National
Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 207, 216 (2002) (stating that possible restraint on escalation during the use of
force are found in the United Nation’s Security Council and international law’s
“principle of the right to self-defense”).
394. See Jacqueline Van De Velde, The Dangers of Forceful Countermeasures as
a Response to Cyber Election Interference, in DEFENDING DEMOCRACIES:
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violent world.395 This messy solution occurs for two reasons: first, by
increasing the risk of force less than an armed attack, without the
possibility of victim states to respond with self-defense, and second,
without any support from the language of the Charter, authorizing
states to use force in the form of countermeasures.396

X. NO GAP SCHOOL
Rather than parsing the differences between the terms “use of force”
from Article 2(4) and “armed attack” from Article 51, the No Gap
School would argue that, effectively, there is no difference. 397
Adherents of this position focus on the “nothing . . . shall impair” and
“inherent right” from the first phrase of Article 51: “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. . . .”398 By this
reading, there is a pre-Charter customary right of self-defense that the
Charter does not extinguish.399 “As the Charter’s drafting history
makes clear, ‘[t]he use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains
admitted and unimpaired.’”400 Thus, the need “to distinguish ‘the most
grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack)
from other less grave forms’”401 is eliminated.402 Any use of force
(presumably, unlawful force), therefore, authorizes a lawful use of
force in response as self-defense.403 This is certainly a minority
COMBATING FOREIGN ELECTION INTERFERENCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 215, 234 (Jens
David Ohlin & Duncan B. Hollis eds., 2017) (arguing that “embracing the doctrine
of forceful countermeasures would give states additional opportunities to escalate
violence as a permissible option” rather than have escalation checks).
395. See Bey, supra note 380, at 31 (noting that cyberspace is a new environment,
which means that the governing norms and treaties are not “universally accepted”).
396. See Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 275–76 (providing an example of how states
construct a personal narrative that justifies and often escalates the use of force).
397. See Sofaer, supra note 346, at 425 (explaining that there is a basic reality in
international law that states inherently have a right to self-defense).
398. U.N. Charter art. 51.
399. See id.
400. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 298 (furthering the idea that the
use of arms in self-defense is a reality of international law).
401. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion
by Simma, J.).
402. Id.
403. OFF. GEN. COUNS., DEP’T DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. L. OF WAR MANUAL §16.3.3,
1016–17,
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opinion in comparison to the more widely accepted Scale and Effects
School;404 however, “[t]he United States has long taken the position
that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any
illegal use of force. Thus, any cyber operation that constitutes an
illegal use of force against a State potentially gives rise to a right to
take necessary and proportionate action in self-defense.”405
The No Gap School certainly proposes a neater rule than
subjectively looking at the “scale and effects” and trying to determine
when an operation crosses the “armed attack” threshold, which, then
and only then, authorizes self-defense.406 Thinking only textually, the
text of Article 51 confuses its purpose.407 First, why use different
words (“use of force” versus “armed attack”)408 in the different
articles, if the drafters intended them to be equal?409 Second, even if
there is a pre-Charter right to self-defense, is it wholly unimpaired? Or
is only the portion of the pre-Charter right that remains after an armed
attack occurs?
One possible answer is that the difference in language is a simple
error, “an inept piece of draftsmenship.”410 This is certainly possible.
Admittedly, despite the best efforts by drafters of any legal document
to divine future disagreements, whether in contracts, statute, or
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%
20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=201612-13-172036-190 (limiting U.S. self-defensive responses to cyber-attacks to cyberattacks that constitute armed attack or imminent threat under U.N. Charter Art. 51)
[hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
404. See Michael J. Glennon, How War Left Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/opinion/how-war-left-the-lawbehind.html (Discussing the Scale and Effects school of thought).
405. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 403, §16.3.3.1, 1017, (further
clarifying U.S. self-defensive responses to cyber-attacks to cyber-attacks that
constitute armed attack under U.N. Charter Art. 51).
406. See Sofaer, supra note 346, at 425.
407. See JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELFDEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (2009) (applying the term strategically rather
than merely textually).
408. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (differentiating “armed attack” from “use of
force”); see U.N. Charter art. 51 (asserting member states’ right to use self-defense).
409. Id. arts. 2, ¶¶ 4, 51.
410. See DIMITRIOS DELIBASIS, THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN
INFORMATION WARFARE OPERATIONS 131 (2007) (articulating the elements of an
armed attack).
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treaties, rarely are these documents given the same level of scrutiny in
drafting as skilled litigants, juris, and scholars do after the fact to serve
the best interests of their clients, desired outcome, or school of
thought.411 Another possibility is that the difference was not
unintended; perhaps it was made in an effort to demonstrate the wide
scope of self-defense, only to inadvertently imply a narrowing
instead.412 Certainly “aggression,”413 also from Article 2(4),
undiscussed here, conjures the German invasion of Poland, whereas
“armed attack”414 might be exactly what the Court in Nicaragua called
a “mere frontier incident,”415 i.e. violence done with arms.416 This
reading would invert the Court’s logic, allowing self-defense in
response to any unlawful armed use of force.417
Most probable is what I would call “cake and eat it too” drafting—
everybody gets what they want. Nations wanting to ensure the Charter
would not prohibit self-defense (the U.S.) can point to “nothing . . .
shall impair,”418 while those nations with recent, valid fears of
powerful neighbors could point to the “if an armed attack occurs.”419
While, none of the drafters were naïve enough to believe that a postCharter era would be a war-free utopia, especially with the origins of
the Cold War already clearly forming, few would have believed that
the Security Council system would be as ineffective as history has
proved.420
411. See Brian Hunt, Plain Language in Legislative Drafting: An Achievable
Objective or a Laudable Ideal?, 24 STATUTE L. REV. 112, 113 (2003) (attempting to
identify the role and purpose of the language used for legislative drafting).
412. But see Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 95, 116 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) (arguing that the legislative intent
of U.N. Charter Art. 2(4) was to strengthen the prohibition on the use of force).
413. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (laying out the different terms “armed attack”
from “use of force”).
414. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (asserting member states’ right to use self-defense).
415. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
416. See id. (clarifying the lower standard implied by “armed attack” than
“aggression”).
417. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶, with Military and Paramilitary Activities,
1986 I.C.J., ¶¶ 232–33, 235, 238, 249 (addressing the Court’s view of the proper
mechanisms for collective self-defense and response to use of force).
418. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
419. Id.
420. See Franck, supra note 10, at 809 (demonstrating how the five permanent
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An alternate explanation is that the “if an armed attack occurs”421
language was not intended to differentiate the gravity between “armed
attack”422 and “use of force,”423 but to limit self-defense to be used only
after a use of force occurred.424 This argument, however, would be at
odds with many of the No Gap School’s adherents other thinking on
preemptive self-defense.425 Putting aside a discussion of preemptive
uses of force, there is reasonableness to the interpretation that the
wording “if an armed attack occurs”426 does not modify the scale
threshold, only the temporality of when self-defense is authorized.427
Unlike the overly complicated, subjectivity of the Scale and Effects
test, the simplicity of the No Gap School’s analysis transfers
effortlessly to the cyber domain.428 Any unlawful use of force
authorizes counterforce in self-defense.429 Where the Tallinn Manual
struggled, the No Gap School would require very little effort to define
any of our three cyberwarfare examples as justifying self-defense: 1)
Stuxnet, 2) an attack causing a stock market crash, and 3) the 2007
Estonia attacks.430 Conceptually, any unlawful use of force, even
destroying one bit of data, justifies the use of self-defense. However,
it seems obvious that no one, now or at the drafting of the Charter,
wants states to begin full-scale wars over truly minor incidents.431 The
No Gap School sees the principle of proportionality being the buffer
to this concern, “the gravity of an attack may affect the proper scope
Security Council members have eroded the protections of Art. 2(4)).
421. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
422. Id.
423. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
424. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
425. See William H. Taft IV, Preemptive Action in Self-Defense, 98 PROC. AM.
SOC. INT’L L. ANN. MEETING 331, 331–32 (2004) (identifying the contexts in which
preemptive self-defense is an acceptable response).
426. See U.N. Charter art. 51 [hereinafter Taft, Preemptive Action].
427. See Taft, Preemptive Action, supra note 426, at 332–33 (further clarifying
when U.S. law permits preemptive self-defense).
428. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 126, 333.
429. See Taft Preemptive Action, supra note 426, at 332–33 (further arguing when
U.S. law permits preemptive self-defense).
430. Compare TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 138–39, 341–42 (admitting
that the law is unclear on which types of cyber activity might qualify as an armed
attack), with McGuinness, supra note 30.
431. See Sofaer, supra note 346, at 427–28 (raising the possibility that the No Gap
school would reduce the effectiveness of existing interpretations of the Charter).
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of the defensive use of force . . . , but it is not relevant to determining
whether there is a right of self-defense in the first instance.”432 Further,
policy and politics will also be a check against full scale wars—
accountability imbued in the classic distinction between “can” and
“should.”
Predictively, this School is certainly closer to the way states behave.
As with countermeasures, self-defense cannot be used as retaliation,433
so there must be an ongoing use of force.434 Still, as with the U.S.
attacks in Libya after the German nightclub bombing,435 states will still
employ “creative fictions”436 to justify self-defense.437 These creative
fictions, however, are relative to the necessity rather than the scale and
are just as likely as in the scale and effects test.438
Descriptively, the No Gaps School downplays arguments over the
obvious textual disconnect between Articles 2(4) and 51.439 The
School’s wholesale dismissal of the Nicaragua judgment is correct.
First, as previously discussed, the Nicaragua decision is, at best, a
judicial foul ball, an absolute miss in terms of what the law is and how
to apply it.440 Secondly, ICJ opinions are only binding on the parties
concerned and only in the current dispute.441 Whatever precedential
value ICJ decisions have, they are only as “a subsidiary means for
determination of the rule of law,” valued at the same level of
importance as “the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists.”442 Customary law is a primary source, considered superior
432. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 300 (questioning whether there is
a gravity requirement to justify collective self-defense).
433. See DINSTEIN supra note 339, at 184 (identifying the difficulty in defining
proportionality).
434. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 302–06 (addressing the United
States’ position of accepting the principle of distinction in self-defense).
435. See McCredie, supra note 371, at 216.
436. See FRANCK, supra note 292, at 112 (acknowledging that states use
convenient legal fictions to justify uses of force).
437. See id. (providing examples of the legal fictions used to justify uses of force).
438. Id.
439. See Sofaer, supra note 346, at 422–28 (objecting to the No Gap school as
tolerating a restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4)).
440. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 191, 195 (June 27).
441. See Netherlands Letter, supra note 101.
442. ICJ Statute, supra note 144, art. 38 ¶ 1(d).
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to judicial decisions, and discerned by “international custom, as
evidence of a general practice of accepted law.”443 Further, from the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, “any subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.”444 States, as evidenced by the
preceding discussion,445 may not be in general agreement; however,
there certainly is a frequent practice of using self-defense in response
to any unlawful use of force.446 While the Scale and Effects School
(and to a lesser degree, the Forceful Countermeasures School)
attempts to adhere to a textual and judicial interpretation of the
Charter, they essentially disregard state practice and state speech
entirely.447 While there are certainly challenges with all of the Schools’
readings of the text, state practice is much more straightforward. 448
One need not go all the way over to the Charter-is-Dead thinking to
still preserve a logical interpretation of the text that mostly conforms
to practice, or, at least, what states say when justifying force. 449 As a
descriptive matter, the No Gap School expresses an intellectually
constant interpretation of the Charter text, accommodating for
subsequent state practice.450 Further, the interpretation is not only
workable, but also much less of a victim to subjectivity than the scale
and effects test.451
443. Id. art. 38 ¶ 1(b).
444. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 ¶ 3(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
445. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 303 (recognizing international
consensus that states use self-defense when attacked).
446. See id. (recognizing international consensus that states use self-defense when
attacked).
447. See JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELFDEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128, 132 (2009) (differentiating between state
speech and state action).
448. But see Franck, supra note 10, at 809 (arguing that the lack of clarity in the
Charter allows state practice to erode the Charter).
449. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 74, 248, 252, 282 (June 27) (Addressing the fact
that states may invoke self-defense to take actions that would otherwise be
wrongful).
450. See Sofaer, supra note 346, at 425 (rejecting the ICJ’s differentiation
between “armed attack” and “countermeasures”).
451. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 300–01 (referencing the “gravity”
test as subjective).
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Prescriptively, the No Gap School also provides the most desirable
outcome.452 First, as with all but the Charter-is-Dead School, force is
clearly unlawful, but once used, self-defense becomes lawful.453 The
No Gap framing entirely does away with the messy, unworkable
forceful countermeasures system, while still giving states a credible
and useable means to challenge original unlawful uses of force.454
Contrary to the perceived bias of the Court in Nicaragua,455 this
framing would lead to less violence, not more, by creating a bright line
rule not subject to the subjectivity of the scale and effects test,456 which
otherwise “would encourage states to engage in a series of small-scale
military attacks, in the hopes that they could do so without being
subject to defensive responses.”457 While powerful states will always
use force in their best interest, a bright line rule will simply separate
unlawful from lawful force.458
The most credible counterargument to the No Gap lens is that any
unlawful use of force, potentially even the destruction of one bit of
data, could lead to full-scale war.459 As discussed, this fear is
unfounded legally because of both adherence to the principle of
proportionality and the long-held belief that self-defense would only
be appropriate in response to an unlawful use of force.460
One could also argue that No Gap would simply be substituting one
452. See id. at 298–99 (expressing that the U.S. does not believe that the ICJ
intended to impose such harsh limitations in the Oil Platforms decision).
453. Id. at 302–03 (explaining proportionality).
454. Id. at 302–05 (addressing the right to self-defense and further explaining
proportionality).
455. See Paul Lewis, World Court Supports Nicaragua After U.S. Rejected
Judges’
Role,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/28/world/world-court-supports-nicaragua-afterus-rejected-judges-role.html (identifying earlier tensions between the U.S. and the
ICJ).
456. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 300–01 (expressing skepticism
over an objective gravity standard).
457. Id. at 300-01. (“Moreover, if States were required to wait until attacks
reached a high level before responding with force, their eventual response, would
likely be much greater, making it more difficult to prevent disputes from escalating
to full-scale military conflicts.”).
458. See Lewis, supra note 455.
459. Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 300–01.
460. See id. at 302–05 (Addressing states’ right to self-defense).
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subjective standard, “scale and effects,” for another,
“proportionality.”461 However, proportionality is a preexisting concept
in international law, with a much stronger consensus than the scale and
effects test in customary, judicial, and academic debate.462 Secondly,
proportionality would still exist within self-defense of the Scale and
Effects School,463 so the No Gap School would not be substituting one
subjectivity for another, but simply subtracting one of the subjective
elements.464 Admittedly, the importance of proportionality would
obviously be higher, moving away from a “scale and effects” gravity
threshold.465
In determining what unlawful force in the cyber domain looks like,
it is helpful to recall our three comparisons: electronic jamming versus
destroying communication networks; economic sanctions versus
blockades; and espionage versus sabotage.466 Again, as previously
discussed,467 jamming is perhaps illegal, but not generally viewed as a
use of force, whereas the destruction of communication networks
would be.468 Therefore, self-defense would not be lawful in response
461. Katherine Vorderbruggen, A Rules-Based System? Compliance and
Obligation in International Law, E-INT’L REL. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.eir.info/2018/10/09/a-rules-based-system-compliance-and-obligation-ininternational-law/ (noting that powerful states will always act in their own selfinterest).
462. See Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 305 (further addressing
proportionality); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 127–30, 348–50
(distinguishing countermeasure proportionality from the law of attack
proportionality); FRANCK, supra note 292, at 91 (questioning the proportionality of
large-scale self-defense responses to actions by terrorist bases of operation);
DINSTEIN, supra note 339, at 185–86 (identifying a two-step process in which a state
decides to use self-defense and an international forum gauges the legality of the
response).
463. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 194 (June 27) (identifying necessity and
proportionality as the prerequisites to self-defense actions).
464. Compare U.N. Charter art. 51, with Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 194
(examining scale and effects against proportionality). See also Taft, Self-Defense,
supra note 174, at 299–300.
465. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109 (supporting a single large response to
several smaller initial aggressions).
466. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 141–42 (defining cyber warfare).
467. See United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea art. 109, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
468. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817,
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to a cyber-attack that resembled short-term jamming, while it would
be lawful when an attack more fully resembles the destruction or even
partial destruction of communication networks, which would be
considered both unlawful and a use of force.469
Likewise, with economic sanctions versus a blockade, while both
fundamentally target the economic capacity of another state, there is a
fundamental difference between sanctions, tariffs, or trade practice
and a blockade, the former being both lawful (absent a treaty
obligation) and non-forceful, the latter being both unlawful and
forceful.470 The view that economic pressures cannot be uses of force
is understandable and desirable, but there is a fundamental difference
between national policies that have detrimental economic effects in
another nation and acts that enter the sovereign space of another state
(even digitally) and prevent its access to global markets.471
The Tallinn Manual does excellent work in the area of advancing
ideas of sovereignty in the cyber sphere;472 however, there is still
much-needed development in the outline of cyber sovereignty. 473 The
manner in which data moves--potentially through all states, as well as
international spaces—there are many overlaps between the early days
821 (2012) (defining “cyber-attack”).
469. Id.; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 141–42.
470. See Daniel McCormack & Henry Pascoe, Sanctions and Preventive War, 61
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1711, 1715 (2017) (discussing how sanctions affect relative
power).
471. See id. at 1729 (“When sanctions bind too tightly, they may cause, rather
than help avoid, conflict. In fact, the global shock to oil prices that helped to collapse
the ruble in late 2014 may augur for a weakening of sanctions.”).
472. See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 11–29 (outlining the
different iterations of state sovereignty and their applications in cyberspace). But see
id. at 12 (rejecting an application of various zones to differing levels of sovereignty,
stating, “It also is sometimes suggested that it should be assimilated to the high seas,
international airspace, or outer space in the sense that of constituting a ‘global
common’ . . . While such characterizations may be useful in other than legal
contexts, the International Group of Experts did not adopt them on the ground that
they disregard the territorial features of cyberspace.”).
473. See id. at 3 (“[B]ecause State cyber practice is mostly classified and publicly
available expressions of opinio juris are sparse, it is difficult to definitively identify
any cyber- specific customary international law.”); ASHLEY S. BOYLE, MOVING
TOWARD TALLINN: DRAFTING THE SHAPE OF CYBER WARFARE 1 (2012) (noting that
“high-profile cyber operations have underscored the need for explicit codes of
conduct in international cyberspace”).
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of the law of the sea and the cyber world.474
Today, we are likely in a cyber-version of Grotius’ Mare Librium
or free seas.475 Then, like now, there is (mostly) room for everyone.476
The harvest of the cyber oceans are abundant and enough for
everyone.477 A state still cannot control beyond what a cannon can hit
from their shores.478 But, far quicker than from the time of Grotius to
the UN Convention on the Law of Seas, there may emerge some
greater ability to control cyber space or detrimental actions that
infringe on the sovereignty of others.479 Even if an ability to control
cyberspace does not develop, the desire to better clarify domains
will.480 While not the focus of this writing, I encourage future legal
development in this area of separating spaces, with differing degrees
of sovereignty, expectations, and rights in different zones. Not
perfectly congruent, the zones established in UNCLOS, internal
waters, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones and high seas,
as well as the concept of innocent passage have salience in our
understanding of cyberspace sovereignty.481
474. See Peter Dombrowski & Chris C. Demchak, Cyber War, Cybered Conflict,
and the Maritime Domain, 67 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 71, 72–73 (2014)
(introducing the challenges and opportunities of cyberspace for U.S. national
security).
475. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (David Armitage, ed. 2004); see generally
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 11–29 (discussing the principle of
sovereignty within the cyberspace).
476. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 12 (describing cyberspace as a
“global domain”).
477. Id.
478. See H. S. K. Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J.
INT’L L. 537, 537–38 (1954) (discussing the cannon-shot rule).
479. See Max Smeets, The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations, 12
STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 90, 90–91 (2018) (discussing theoretical parameters of
effective military operations).
480. See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 12, 232–99 (discussing
sovereignty, law of the sea, air law, space law, and international telecommunications
law).
481. See William M. Stahl, The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the
Principles of International Maritime Law to the Problem of Cybersecurity, 40 GA.
J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 247, 251 (2011) (noting that UNCLOS “addresses the duty
of sovereign states to combat piracy outside its jurisdiction, including in
international waters”); United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, supra note
271, pmbl.; JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
ILLUSIONS IN A BORDERLESS WORLD 1–10 (2006) (discussing territorial questions
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The power of the cyber domain is that it is not a physical space in
the most conventional sense, yet it works like a bridge, connecting
people, while also creating news spaces, traversed by all.482 When a
European sends an email to Singapore, it does not pass through all the
territories across Europe and Asia, eventually passing into Thailand,
then Malaysia, finally stopping at its destination.483 Neither does it hop
on the ‘high seas’ of the internet and ‘sail’ extra-territorially through
the Mediterranean, through the Suez, to the India Ocean, Straits of
Malacca, arriving in the port of Singapore.484 It gets broken into the
millions of bits of data and travels everywhere at once finding the path
of least resistance485—the parallels to water are unmistakable.486 This
“liquidity” poses interesting questions about how one state would send
a cyber weapon into another: is it not simply crossing that final
international border that poses a potential international trespass, but
also every state in between.487 Is there a concept of innocent passage?
What about malware that has the potential to infect everywhere, but is
only specifically activated in a selected target later? These questions
are unanswerable now, but once better consensus can be achieved,
related to cyberspace).
482. See Glenn Alexander Crowther, The Cyber Domain, 2 CYBER DEF. REV. 63,
63 (2017) (mentioning that cyberspace is defined as a global domain in the
information environment).
483. See Steven Li, How Does the Internet Work?, MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://medium.com/@User3141592/how-does-the-internet-work-edc2e22e7eb8
(discussing how packet routing networks move data from their source to their
destination).
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY
REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934 8 (2011) (“The issue of
the legality of transporting cyber ‘weapons’ across the Internet through the
infrastructure owned and/or located in neutral third countries without obtaining the
equivalent of ‘overflight rights.’ . . . The interconnected nature of cyberspace poses
significant challenges for applying some of the legal frameworks developed for
specific physical domains. The law of armed conflict and customary international
law, however, provide a strong basis to apply such norms to cyberspace governing
responsible state behavior. Significant multinational work remains to clarify the
application of norms and principles of customary international law to cyberspace.”).
487. See id. (“The interconnected nature of cyberspace poses significant
challenges for applying some of the legal frameworks developed for specific
physical domains.”).
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both the dialogue and conclusions reached will inform the ultimate
question of lawfulness of cyber operations. For now, when
considering the unlawfulness of cyber operations, we are confined to
a Mare Librium context—a cyberspace without much developed law
or control.488
Finally, the comparison of espionage versus sabotage. Espionage,
likely lawful (internationally), is not a use of force, and therefore selfdefense is not justified.489 Sabotage is, again, both unlawful and a use
of force.490 Therefore, a purely cyber spying operation, would not
authorize self-defense, whereas a cyber-sabotage operation, like
Stuxnet, with or without physical effects, would.491
An interesting consideration is a cyber-spying operation that causes
some damage on the path to the desired data. While I have advanced
what can only be seen as a hardline view that any digital damage could
constitute a use of force justifying self-defense,492 some reasonableness
should apply. The intent of the cyber spy should not be considered
relevant, however, as with what might be called “traditional
espionage,” there may be a “forceful entry” to the space containing the
information sought, such as a broken lock or door, that would not rise
488. GROTIUS, supra note 475; See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note
4, at 11–29 (discussing the principle of sovereignty within the cyberspace).
489. See Beth D. Graboritz et al., Why the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) Must
Be Expanded to Cover Vital Civilian Data, 5 CYBER DEF. REV. 121, 125–26 (2020)
(stating that manipulating or targeting data during cyber espionage is unprotected
under the Law of Armed Conflict).
490. See Silver, supra note 3, at 73, 75 (asserting that computer network attacks
are likely considered force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter).
491. See Graboritz et al., supra note 489, at 125–26 (citing experts whose majority
opinion in the Tallum Manual was that a cyber-attack on a State’s infrastructure
violated sovereignty if it created damage); Silver, supra note 3, at 75 (“[C]ertain
applications of CNA are likely to be held to constitute force under Article 2(4), but
many applications are likely not to.”); Irving Lachow, The Stuxnet Enigma:
Implications for the Future of Cybersecurity, 11 GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
118, 125 (2011) (“These response options must encompass measures to minimize
the damage caused by a Stuxnet-like attack, to enable rapid reconstitution of
necessary capabilities, and to take actions (if desired) against the perpetrators of such
an attack.”).
492. See Silver, supra note 3, at 75 (noting that a school of thought, focusing on
the malicious and destructive nature of computer network attacks, advocates that the
attacks should be considered a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter).
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to the level of sabotage.493 There should be some similar exception to
what could be called the “broken lock rule” in the cyber domain. 494
Espionage is certainly unlawful in domestic systems, and perpetrators
expose themselves to criminal domestic prosecution.495 Breaking a
code or other digital protection—i.e. truly minor damage—while
stealing information should not be viewed as a use of force. There
must be some floor to a use of force.
Finally, regarding prescriptive analysis of what the law should be,
as previously discussed,496 fears that the No Gap School will lead to
full-scale war are unfounded because principles of necessity and
proportionality will be substantial checks on self-defense in
response.497 Firstly, “there is no legal requirement that the response in
self-defense to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action,
as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and
proportionality.”498 While physical force certainly can be used in
response to unlawful cyber force, necessity and proportionality would
govern that the force used is necessary to stop the attack.499 This lower
bar to the threshold of self-defense certainly seems desirable for power
states in conventional domains,500 but Ryan Goodman posits, that
because the U.S. has the most to defend, militarily, economically, etc.
the deterrence effect of dominate conventional force may not be as
effective as in the cyber domain, where attribution will be quite
difficult.501 Moreover, for the force to be necessary, the attack must be
ongoing or at least reasonably believed to not have stopped. 502 Any
493. See id. at 76–77 (listing several purposes for cyber intrusions).
494. See id. at 75.
495. Espionage Act, 22 U.S.C. § 406 (2014).
496. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 11–
29.
497. See Schmitt II, supra note 252, at 913 (arguing that proportionality balances
positive consequences against harmful ones).
498. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 403, at 1017.
499. Hathaway et al., supra note 468, at 849 (noting that evaluating whether selfdefense complies with necessity and proportionality is increasingly difficult with
cyber-attacks).
500. Id. at 850 (discussing ad bellum and in bello necessity and proportionality).
501. Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed
Attack”, JUST SEC. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyberoperations-u-s-definition-armed-attack.
502. See id. (“[I]n a world in which States very frequently engage in low-level
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force used after a completed and final attack is simply retaliation, not
self-defense.503
The pin-pick scenario is again helpful here: assuming the likelihood
of an ongoing series of small attacks, the No Gap School would be
unconcerned whether the collection aggregated to an armed attack. 504
The first prick, in and of itself, would constitute an unlawful use of
force surpassing the threshold question justifying self-defense.505
Thereafter, the ongoing series of attacks creates the necessity to use
force in response.506 Proportionality is not viewed in relation to the
scale of the original attack, but in relation to the necessity to stop the
attack.507 Full-scale war will never be the lawful response to an attack
that can be reasonably stopped with a hack-back or even a single
missile-strike.508
Necessity and proportionality are certainly not principles that are
exclusive to the No Gap School, but they are the guard rails the Court
in Nicaragua failed to use effectively.509 Because of the lower
uses of force in cyber, or might be thought to have done so by their adversaries . . .
many States will have the legal right to use force in self-defense against others on
an ongoing basis.”).
503. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 184–85 (expressing that this idea is embodied
within the principles of necessity and immediacy but that this “condition must be
construed ‘broadly.’ . . . [a] lapse of time is almost unavoidable.”).
504. See GRAY, supra note 132, at 107 (“In cases of repeated cross-border
incursions commentators have spoken of the ‘accumulation of events’ or ‘pin-prick’
theory of armed attack in order to justify otherwise disproportionate response. That
is, they claim that states may use force not in response to each incursion in isolation
but to the whole series of incursions as collectively amounting to an armed attack.”).
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. See Hargrove, supra note 49, at 136 (“The essence of the Charter principles
is that . . . a state must refrain from using force against other states, except where
force is being used against it. In that case, it is free to defend itself with force as best
it can, provided only that its response is reasonably proportionate to the injury being
inflicted and, in fact, necessary to put an end to it.”); see also Taft, Self-Defense,
supra note 174, at 305 (“There is no requirement in international law that a State
exercising its right of self-defense must use the same degree or type of force used
by the attacking State in its most recent attack. Rather, the proportionality of the
measures taken in self-defense is to be judged according to the nature of the threat
being addressed.”).
508. See Hargrove, supra note 49 (“[R]esponse [to an attack must be] reasonably
proportionate to the injury being inflicted.”).
509. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
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threshold of the No Gap School for the use of self-defense, these
principles become all the more important.510 Necessity and
proportionality become a better and more reasonable means of
regulating state behavior than the scale and effects test.511 When
compared from a factual perspective, state responses to force might
appear similar to the Forceful Countermeasures School--small scale
attacks producing small scale responses.512 But the use of the No Gap
legal framing does not produce the messy “quadruple structure”513
analysis Dinstein attributed to the Court in Nicaragua force short of
an armed attack, responded to with force short of self-defense, with
the aggressor state then justifying self-defense in response to an
excessively forceful countermeasure.514 The legal analysis effectively
stops, as in the schoolyard with: “who started it.”515

XI.

CONCLUSION

Each of these schools have intellectual and practical advantages and
drawbacks, especially when considering cyber operations.516 Either
they depart from the language of the Charter, moderately to
substantially (Scale and Effects, No Gap, Counter-Measures, Charter-

U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 237 (June 27).
510. See Schmitt, supra note 204, at 913 (discussing the value of the principle of
proportionality).
511. See Hathaway et al., supra note 468, at 850 (discussing in bello necessity
and proportionality); Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109 (discussing the three conditions
of self-defense: necessity, proportionality, and immediacy); Hargrove, supra note
49, at 136 (asserting that under the Charter principles, States must not use force
unless another State is using force against it); Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at
305 (asserting that international law does not require proportionality).
512. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109 (“The counter-measures taken by State
B (kinetically or electronically) must not be out of proportion with the act prompting
them. A modicum of symmetry between force and counter-force––injury inflicted
on State B by the armed attack versus damage sustained by State A by dint of selfdefense counter-measures––is called for.”).
513. DINSTEIN, supra note 339.
514. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 237.
515. See id. (finding that “the reaction of the United States in the context of what
it regarded as self-defence was continued long after the period in which any
presumed armed attack by Nicaragua could reasonably be contemplated.”).
516. Hathaway et al., supra note 468, at 851 (discussing the unique challenges of
the proportionality and analysis of cyber-attacks).
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Is-Dead),517 and/or they come to potentially undesired results (Scale
and Effects--no right to respond to force short of an armed attack;518
Forceful Countermeasures—limited right to respond;519 and CharterIs-Dead—no rules whatsoever).520 There is strong intellectual honesty
in dealing with state practice in both the Charter-Is-Dead and a weakhearted Charter-Is-Dead justification for Forceful Countermeasures.521
Both identify the source of the problem (state abuse) and that the UN
systems do not work in the manner conceived, but their solutions are
unwieldy.522 With the strong possibility and severity of future cyber
warfare, only the dominant Scale and Effects School fails entirely to
provide a clear remedy to such flagrant uses of force such as Stuxnet,
an attack causing a stock market crash, or the 2007 Estonia attack.
The Charter-Is-Dead School certainly has a strong predictive view
on how states will behave, particularly powerful states, particularly in
the cyber domain.523 The Charter-is-Dead would argue descriptively
that that there is no rule preventing cyber-attacks because there is no
longer (or never really was) law preventing the use of force due to
widespread state disregard.524
The No Gap School, however, is closer to how states will behave
and importantly, what they will say when they use force.525 When
attacked with cyber means, especially where there are no physical
517. Hathaway et al., supra note 468, at 850; Dinstein, supra note 32, at 110;
Hargrove, supra note 49, at 136; Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 305.
518. Hathaway et al., supra note 468, at 850 (“A state’s use of armed force in
response to a cyber-attack must not only conform with U.N. Charter and customary
international law limits on the use of armed force, but it must also comply with the
jus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality under customary
international law.”).
519. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 109.
520. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 717–18 (explaining the school of thought that
believe the Charter’s rules on the use of force are “completely devoid of any legal
significant normative value.”).
521. See id. at 715–18 (comparing the Qualitative Threat school and the CharterIs-Dead school).
522. Id.
523. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 717–18 (outlining the views of the Charter-IsDead school).
524. Id.
525. See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force,
13 NAT’L INT. 53, 54–59 (1988) (providing a historical overview on the United
States’ position on the No Gap School and decisions regarding use of force).
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effects, as in situations like the 2007 Estonia attacks and the stock
market crash scenarios, if a state has the means to stop the attack with
physical or cyber means, and it is in their interests, they will.526 Most
likely, states will argue such a cyber-attack is an “armed attack”
(regardless of the test applied) and will respond in self-defense.527
Only the No Gap School would accurately describe this justification
as a lawful response in self-defense to an unlawful use of force.
It would be overly ambitious to attempt to resolve fundamental,
long-debated disagreements about how to read the language of
Articles 2(4) and 51.528 However, analysis applied by the majority
Scale and Effects School, especially when thinking about cyber force,
is unrealistic, unworkable, and undesirable for state actors.529 If
proportionality still governs all uses of counterforce (countermeasures
or self-defense) in response to cyber force, then it is tempting to assign
the entirety of the forgoing argument to the merely academic realm.530
But, especially considering the varying domestic legal prohibitions
against violations of international law of many of the United States’
closest allies, getting the law right is vitally important.531 The domestic
526. Id.; see Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 305 (quoting Judge Roberto
Ago, who explained, “What matters [with respect to proportionality] is the result to
be achieved by the ‘defensive’ action, and not the forms, substance and strength of
the action itself.”).
527. See Hargrove, supra note 49, at 136 (“[U]nless the use of force has been
internationally authorized, a state must refrain from using force against other states,
except where force is being used against it.”); see Hathaway et al., supra note 468,
at 850 (“Although a stand-alone cyber-attack has never instigated an armed conflict,
cyber-attacks have been used in wars in response to traditional provocations or to
prepare the way for an imminent conventional attack.”).
528. See Silver, supra note 3, at 75 (“It is too early for any legal authority to have
emerged on the status of CNA under Article 2(4).”); see also Hargrove, supra note
49, at 139 (“Any suggestion that there are any acts of unlawful force between states
that international law forbids a state from defending against by proportionate
force . . . degrades the concept of international law and diminishes the inducement
for a responsible political leader to take its constraints seriously.”).
529. Dinstein, supra note 32, at 100 (noting that the choice of words in Article 51
is “deliberately restrictive” and leaves little effective protection against states who
violate the use of force prohibition).
530. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 468; Dinstein, supra note 32; Hargrove,
supra note 49; Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174; Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 237
(June 27).
531. See Sofaer, supra note 525, at 54–59 (outlining the United States’ position
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legal adherence to international law of many nations, the Netherlands
in particular, is laudable, but the application of the Nicaragua
judgment’s scale and effects test, as applied to cyber operations in the
Tallinn Manual is simply not the law and should not be used to
consider uses of force in response to cyberwarfare.532

regarding the use of force); Taft, Self-Defense, supra note 174, at 305 (stating
proportionality in use of force is not required under international law).
532. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 11–29.

